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A	  hole	  in	  the	  ground	  protects	  some	  creatures	  but	  endangers	  others.	  Dry	  ground	  
is	  passable	  by	  creatures	  who	  walk,	  but	  fatal	  for	  a	  fish.	  These	  environments	  provide	  
different	  possibilities	  for	  different	  creatures.	  
J.	  J.	  Gibson	  invented	  the	  word	  “affordance”	  to	  denote	  possibilities	  of	  action	  for	  a	  
creature	  that	  are	  given	  by	  the	  environment.1	  He	  proposed	  that	  we	  perceive	  affordances,	  
and	  that	  the	  paradigmatic	  perceptions	  are	  byproducts	  of	  action	  plans.	  These	  proposals	  
inspired	  an	  “action-­‐first”	  approach	  to	  visual	  perception,	  which	  foregrounds	  the	  role	  of	  
the	  perceiver	  as	  an	  actor.	  	  
The	  action-­‐first	  approach	  to	  visual	  perception	  can	  be	  contrasted	  with	  the	  
“spectator-­‐first”	  approach,	  which	  foregrounds	  the	  role	  of	  the	  perceiver	  as	  an	  observer.	  
This	  approach	  is	  heir	  to	  David	  Marr’s	  computational	  theory	  of	  vision,	  and	  like	  Marr’s	  
theory,	  it	  gives	  a	  central	  role	  in	  perception	  to	  belief-­‐like	  representations.	  Here	  the	  
paradigmatic	  perceptions	  are	  observations	  of	  scenes	  with	  which	  one	  does	  not	  
necessarily	  interact,	  such	  as	  watching	  a	  sunset.	  
In	  recent	  years,	  both	  of	  these	  approaches	  have	  been	  used	  to	  investigate	  the	  
nature	  of	  perceptual	  experience,	  leading	  to	  a	  divide	  over	  the	  centrality	  of	  
representation	  in	  analyzing	  perception.2	  On	  the	  surface,	  the	  two	  approaches	  are	  easily	  
reconciled	  by	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  affordances	  are	  on	  par	  with	  color	  and	  shape	  as	  
properties	  represented	  in	  experience.3	  	  But	  even	  if	  affordances	  could	  in	  principle	  be	  
represented	  in	  experience,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  ask	  whether	  they	  have	  to	  be	  so	  
represented	  –	  or	  whether	  instead	  we	  simply	  experience	  affordances	  without	  
representing	  them.	  If	  any	  representations	  of	  affordances	  would	  be	  an	  idle	  wheel	  in	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  to	  John	  Bengson,	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Sebastian	  Rödl,	  and	  Charles	  Siewert,	  and	  to	  Miguel-­‐Angel	  Sebastian	  and	  Anna	  Bergqvist	  
for	  writing	  	  comments	  on	  several	  drafts.	  Thanks	  most	  of	  all	  to	  Sebastian	  Watzl	  for	  many	  
illuminating	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  material.	  
1	  Gibson	  (1977)	  
2	  Proponents	  of	  the	  action-­‐first	  approach	  include	  Hurley	  (1998),	  Noe	  (2006),	  Kelly	  (2006,	  
2010),	  Orlandi	  (forthcoming).	  Proponents	  of	  spectator-­‐first	  approach	  include	  Byrne	  
(2009),	  Chalmers	  (2005),	  Pautz	  (2010),	  Peacocke	  (1995),	  Siegel	  (2010).	  
3	  For	  developments	  of	  this	  idea,	  see	  Bengson	  (ms)	  and	  Nanay	  (2011).	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explaining	  the	  function	  and	  character	  of	  perceptual	  experience,	  that	  would	  go	  some	  way	  
toward	  vindicating	  the	  action-­‐first	  approach.	  And	  if	  most	  properties	  presented	  in	  
experience	  could	  be	  shown	  to	  involve	  affordances,	  that	  would	  suggest	  that	  
representation	  in	  general	  is	  an	  idle	  wheel	  in	  perception.4	  
	  In	  this	  paper,	  I	  draw	  out	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  centrality	  of	  representation	  in	  
perceptual	  experience	  that	  arises	  from	  an	  important	  class	  of	  experiences	  of	  affordances.	  
These	  are	  experiences	  of	  the	  environment	  as	  compelling	  you	  to	  act	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  
solicited	  or	  afforded	  by	  the	  environment.	  	  I	  call	  such	  experiences	  experienced	  mandates.	  
They	  are	  generally	  structured	  by	  how	  you	  are	  already	  acting	  in	  a	  situation	  -­‐	  not	  only	  by	  
how	  you	  can	  act	  or	  are	  disposed	  to	  act	  in	  it.	  From	  your	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  environment	  
pulls	  actions	  out	  of	  you	  directly,	  like	  a	  force	  moving	  a	  situation,	  with	  your	  actions	  in	  it,	  
from	  one	  moment	  to	  the	  next.	  	  Experiences	  like	  these	  were	  discussed	  by	  Merleau-­‐Ponty	  
in	  the	  1960’s,	  and	  they	  figure	  prominently	  in	  recent	  discussions	  by	  Hubert	  Dreyfus,	  
Adrian	  Cussins,	  and	  Sean	  Kelly,	  among	  others.5	  These	  experiences	  help	  us	  make	  sense	  of	  
the	  idea	  that	  affordances	  could	  be	  experienced	  without	  being	  represented:	  the	  
environment	  invites	  or	  solicits	  an	  activity,	  and	  you	  experience	  these	  affordances	  by	  
doing,	  or	  feeling	  moved	  to	  do,	  what	  they	  invite	  you	  to	  do.	  From	  these	  experiences	  we	  
can	  reconstruct	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  primacy	  of	  representation	  in	  perception.	  
	   We	  can	  use	  experienced	  mandates	  to	  ask	  three	  questions	  about	  the	  role	  of	  
representation	  in	  perception.	  	  
	  
Q1.	  Do	  experienced	  mandates	  have	  any	  representational	  contents?	  	  	  
	   	  
Q2.	  Do	  experienced	  mandates	  have	  any	  representational	  contents	  relevant	  to	  
explaining	  why	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  the	  subject	  to	  perform	  the	  action	  she	  
experiences	  as	  mandated?	  
	   	  
Q3.	  Is	  there	  any	  proposition	  that	  could	  reflect	  the	  mandate	  that	  the	  subject	  
experiences,	  if	  that	  proposition	  were	  the	  content	  of	  the	  experience?	  
	   	  
I’m	  going	  to	  assume	  that	  experienced	  mandates	  have	  perceptual	  experiences	  as	  a	  part,	  
and	  that	  an	  experienced	  mandate	  counts	  as	  having	  representational	  contents	  if	  its	  
component	  perceptual	  experience	  does.	  Questions	  Q1-­‐Q3	  then	  bear	  directly	  on	  the	  role	  
of	  representation	  in	  perceptual	  experience.	  Regarding	  Q1,	  if	  experienced	  mandates	  
have	  no	  representational	  content,	  then	  their	  component	  perceptual	  experiences	  do	  not	  
either,	  challenging	  the	  primacy	  of	  representation	  in	  perceptual	  experience.	  Regarding	  
Q2,	  if	  experienced	  mandates	  have	  no	  contents	  relevant	  to	  explaining	  the	  associated	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Kelly	  (2006)	  suggests	  that	  experiences	  of	  color	  and	  shape	  are	  always	  experienced	  
mandates,	  in	  which	  colors	  and	  shapes	  solicit	  us	  to	  view	  them	  in	  certain	  ways,	  and	  that	  
none	  of	  these	  experiences	  involve	  representation.	  
5	  Merleau-­‐Ponty,	  The	  Phenomenology	  of	  Perception,	  Kelly	  (2005),	  Cussins	  (1990),	  
Dreyfus	  (2002,	  2005).	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actions,	  then	  no	  component	  perceptual	  experiences	  do	  either,	  challenging	  the	  
explanatory	  relevance	  of	  any	  representational	  contents	  perceptual	  experiences	  may	  
have.	  Regarding	  Q3,	  if	  we	  could	  identify	  a	  proposition	  that	  would	  characterize	  the	  
mandate	  that	  the	  subject	  experiences,	  then	  representational	  contents	  could	  in	  principle	  
help	  to	  illuminate	  this	  distinctive	  phenomenon.	  
	  
	   To	  assess	  these	  questions,	  I	  explain	  more	  fully	  what	  experienced	  mandates	  are	  	  
and	  how	  they	  challenge	  the	  primacy	  of	  representation	  in	  experience	  in	  Part	  I,	  and	  then	  I	  
address	  all	  three	  questions	  in	  Part	  II,	  where	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  answer	  to	  all	  of	  them	  is	  Yes.	  
	  
	   Once	  these	  questions	  are	  on	  the	  table,	  it	  is	  natural	  to	  wonder	  whether	  mandates	  
are	  represented	  in	  certain	  perceptual	  experiences	  –	  not	  just	  whether	  any	  
representational	  contents	  could	  in	  principle	  reflect	  the	  feeling	  of	  an	  action	  being	  
solicited	  and	  mandated	  by	  an	  object	  or	  situation.	  Since	  the	  stronger	  thesis	  that	  
mandates	  are	  represented	  in	  experienced	  mandates	  entails	  positive	  answers	  to	  
questions	  Q1-­‐Q3,	  one	  could	  reach	  the	  conclusions	  I	  defend	  here	  in	  one	  fell	  swoop	  by	  
defending	  the	  stronger	  thesis	  directly.	  But	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  consider	  questions	  Q1-­‐Q3	  on	  
their	  own.	  By	  proceeding	  this	  way,	  we	  can	  distinguish	  more	  easily	  between	  challenges	  
to	  the	  primacy	  of	  representation	  in	  perception	  that	  arise	  at	  different	  levels	  of	  generality,	  
and	  we	  can	  examine	  the	  role	  of	  representation	  in	  experienced	  mandates	  more	  fully.	  In	  
addition,	  my	  route	  to	  identifying	  contents	  that	  could	  in	  principle	  reflect	  mandates	  
suggests	  a	  strategy	  for	  defending	  the	  stronger	  claim.	  Without	  offering	  a	  full	  defense	  of	  
the	  claim,	  I’ll	  outline	  the	  argumentative	  strategy	  at	  the	  end.	  
	  
	  
Part	  I.	  Experienced	  mandates	  
	  
1.	  Affordances	  and	  experienced	  mandates	  
	  Experienced	  mandates	  are	  a	  kind	  of	  experience	  of	  a	  type	  of	  affordance.	  We	  can	  
characterize	  them	  more	  fully,	  by	  locating	  them	  in	  relation	  to	  three	  kinds	  of	  affordances	  
that	  are	  good	  candidates	  for	  being	  experienced.	  
	  
Proto-­‐affordances	  are	  possibilities	  unrelated	  to	  agency,	  either	  because	  they	  are	  
possibilities	  for	  objects	  that	  lack	  agency,	  or	  they	  are	  possibilities	  to	  which	  a	  subject’s	  
agency	  is	  irrelevant.	  Suppose	  you	  see	  a	  ball	  with	  its	  edge	  resting	  on	  the	  stalk	  of	  a	  plant	  
on	  a	  hill,	  another	  rock	  teetering	  on	  the	  edge	  of	  a	  cliff,	  and	  a	  path	  with	  two	  people	  
walking	  toward	  each	  other.	  The	  proto-­‐affordances	  here	  include	  the	  rollability	  of	  the	  ball	  
down	  the	  hill,	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  teetering	  rock	  could	  fall	  off	  the	  cliff,	  and	  the	  fact	  
that	  the	  two	  hikers	  could	  pass	  one	  another	  without	  stopping	  or	  colliding.	  If	  a	  subject	  
perceptually	  experienced	  them,	  these	  proto-­‐affordances	  would	  characterize	  how	  the	  
ball,	  the	  rock,	  the	  path,	  and	  the	  pedestrians	  look	  to	  that	  subject.	  One	  might	  associate	  
various	  actions	  with	  the	  proto-­‐affordances,	  such	  as	  freeing	  the	  ball,	  tipping	  over	  the	  
rock,	  or	  moving	  aside	  to	  let	  an	  oncoming	  person	  pass.	  But	  in	  principle,	  a	  subject	  need	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not	  experience	  these	  actions	  as	  possible,	  simply	  in	  virtue	  of	  experiencing	  the	  proto-­‐
affordances	  that	  prompt	  the	  associations.	  
	  
	   Unlike	  proto-­‐affordances,	  affordances	  proper	  involve	  possibilities	  of	  action	  for	  a	  
creature.	  Suppose	  you	  see	  a	  bed	  that	  you	  could	  plop	  down	  on	  to	  rest	  –	  it	  is	  not	  flimsy	  
cardboard,	  or	  full	  of	  nails	  underneath,	  or	  a	  cavernous	  pit	  in	  disguise.	  If	  you	  experience	  
this	  affordance,	  then	  you	  would	  experience	  the	  bed	  as	  a	  place	  to	  stop	  and	  rest.	  If	  the	  
bed	  really	  was	  a	  cavernous	  pit	  in	  disguise,	  then	  your	  experience	  would	  be	  falsidical.	  
Similarly,	  consider	  a	  tuft	  of	  hair	  that	  covers	  your	  interlocutor’s	  left	  eye	  but	  could	  be	  
moved	  aside,	  or	  a	  thick	  forest	  that	  would	  shelter	  you	  from	  heavy	  wind	  and	  rain.	  Here,	  
the	  forest	  affords	  protection,	  and	  the	  tuft	  of	  hair	  affords	  being	  moved	  out	  of	  the	  way	  to	  
provide	  better	  eye	  contact.	  If	  you	  experienced	  these	  affordances,	  you	  would	  experience	  
the	  hair	  as	  covering	  the	  eye	  like	  a	  curtain	  that	  you	  could	  open	  to	  improve	  your	  eye	  
contact,	  and	  the	  forest	  as	  a	  place	  that	  could	  shelter	  you.	  If	  the	  forest	  turned	  out	  to	  
harbor	  monsters,	  or	  the	  interlocutor	  had	  only	  one	  eye,	  then	  these	  experiences	  would	  be	  
falsidical.	  
	  
The	  experiences	  of	  affordances	  I’ve	  described	  so	  far	  are	  fully	  characterized	  even	  
if	  the	  subject	  does	  not	  feel	  invited,	  solicited,	  or	  prompted	  to	  enter	  the	  forest,	  move	  the	  
hair,	  or	  plop	  down	  on	  the	  bed.	  We	  can	  say	  that	  an	  affordance	  by	  X	  (hair,	  forest,	  bed)	  of	  
phi-­‐ability	  is	  a	  non-­‐soliciting	  affordance	  for	  a	  subject	  S,	  if	  X	  is	  experienced	  by	  S	  as	  
affording	  phi-­‐ability,	  but	  X	  is	  not	  experienced	  as	  soliciting,	  inviting,	  or	  otherwise	  
prompting	  S	  herself	  to	  phi.	  So	  if	  X’s	  affordance	  is	  non-­‐soliciting	  for	  S,	  it	  is	  experienced	  by	  
S,	  and	  it	  is	  not	  experienced	  by	  S	  as	  soliciting.	  
	  
In	  contrast,	  suppose	  the	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  an	  important	  conversation	  the	  tuft	  of	  
hair	  keeps	  falling	  over	  your	  interlocutor’s	  eye,	  obstructing	  proper	  communication	  by	  
interfering	  with	  eye	  contact.	  	  You	  might	  well	  experience	  the	  hair	  as	  an	  obstacle	  that	  
should	  be	  moved	  away	  to	  allow	  for	  fuller	  eye	  contact.	  Or	  suppose	  you	  see	  a	  perfectly	  
moist,	  frosted	  piece	  of	  chocolate	  cake	  resting	  on	  a	  plate	  with	  a	  fork	  on	  a	  napkin	  next	  to	  
it.	  You	  might	  well	  feel	  solicited	  by	  the	  cake	  to	  eat	  it.	  Similarly,	  you	  might	  feel	  invited	  by	  
the	  forest	  to	  enter	  it	  if	  you	  need	  shelter.	  We	  can	  say	  that	  an	  affordance	  by	  X	  (hair,	  
forest,	  cake)	  of	  phi-­‐ability	  is	  a	  soliciting	  affordance	  for	  a	  subject	  S,	  if	  it	  is	  experienced	  by	  
S	  as	  soliciting,	  inviting,	  or	  otherwise	  prompting	  S	  herself	  to	  phi.	  6	  So	  if	  X’s	  affordance	  
solicits	  a	  subject	  S,	  then	  X	  is	  experienced	  by	  S	  as	  soliciting.7	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  We	  can	  also	  be	  moved	  to	  action	  by	  unconscious	  perception	  of	  things.	  In	  a	  broader	  
sense	  than	  the	  one	  used	  here,	  those	  perceptions	  would	  be	  perceptions	  of	  soliciting	  
affordances	  as	  well.	  
7	  I’ve	  called	  these	  affordances	  “soliciting	  affordances”	  and	  “non-­‐soliciting	  affordances”,	  
and	  it	  is	  natural	  to	  call	  the	  corresponding	  experiences	  “soliciting	  experiences”	  and	  “non-­‐
soliciting	  experiences.”	  But	  please	  disregard	  any	  suggestion	  by	  these	  locutions	  that	  the	  
affordances	  or	  the	  experiences	  are	  (or	  are	  felt	  as)	  the	  things	  that	  do	  the	  soliciting.	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One	  and	  the	  same	  thing	  could	  be	  experienced	  as	  affording	  different	  things	  on	  
different	  occasions.	  A	  forest	  might	  be	  experienced	  as	  a	  shelter	  if	  you	  need	  protection,	  
but	  as	  an	  obstacle	  to	  be	  circumvented	  if	  it	  stands	  between	  point	  A	  where	  you	  are	  and	  
point	  B	  where	  you’re	  going.	  Similarly,	  the	  forest	  might	  be	  experienced	  as	  soliciting	  
entrance	  on	  one	  occasion	  but	  not	  soliciting	  entrance	  on	  another,	  even	  if	  it	  is	  
experienced	  as	  proto-­‐affording	  shelter	  both	  times.	  	  	  
	  
Among	  soliciting	  experiences,	  we	  could	  distinguish	  between	  increments	  of	  felt	  
solicitation.	  A	  piece	  of	  cake	  might	  look	  perfectly	  positioned	  to	  be	  eaten,	  but	  not	  so	  
appealing	  that	  you	  experience	  it	  as	  something	  that	  is	  calling	  out	  to	  be	  eaten.	  The	  hair	  
over	  the	  eye	  might	  look	  easily	  movable,	  but	  you	  might	  have	  reconciled	  yourself	  to	  the	  
hairstyle,	  so	  that	  you	  don’t	  experience	  the	  hair	  as	  calling	  loudly	  to	  be	  moved	  aside.	  
These	  are	  differences	  in	  increments	  of	  felt	  solicitation.	  
	  
Experienced	  mandates	  belong	  to	  the	  category	  of	  soliciting	  experiences	  and	  have	  
a	  high	  degree	  of	  felt	  solicitation.	  With	  the	  ball	  coming	  toward	  you	  in	  a	  tennis	  game,	  the	  
felt	  solicitation	  to	  swing	  your	  racket	  and	  hit	  it	  might	  be	  so	  strong	  that	  no	  other	  option	  
enters	  your	  mind.	  	  
	  
But	  what	  exactly	  is	  it	  to	  feel	  solicited	  to	  do	  something	  (to	  phi)	  by	  a	  slice	  of	  cake,	  a	  
forest,	  or	  a	  tennis	  ball?	  In	  particular,	  how	  does	  this	  feeling	  relate	  to	  a	  motivation	  or	  urge	  
to	  phi?	  Conceptually,	  solicitation	  in	  the	  sense	  used	  here	  and	  motivation	  can	  come	  apart.	  
Suppose	  you	  hear	  music	  that	  (you	  can	  tell)	  is	  designed	  to	  be	  danced	  to,	  but	  you	  feel	  
completely	  unmoved	  by	  it	  to	  dance.8	  The	  music,	  as	  you	  hear	  it,	  is	  telling	  you	  to	  dance,	  
but	  you	  don’t	  feel	  its	  pull.	  It	  is	  as	  if	  the	  music	  is	  trying	  to	  make	  you	  dance,	  but	  you	  are	  
not	  cooperating	  and	  have	  no	  inclination	  to	  cooperate.	  Similarly,	  the	  neatly	  stacked	  
colorful	  packs	  of	  candy	  thoughtfully	  placed	  at	  eye	  level	  in	  the	  grocery	  store	  check-­‐out	  
line	  are	  supposed	  to	  make	  us	  disposed	  to	  buy	  them.	  The	  exhortative	  tone	  of	  many	  
advertisements	  on	  radio	  and	  television	  has	  an	  analog	  in	  visual	  displays,	  and	  we	  can	  feel	  
that	  they	  are	  designed	  to	  propel	  us	  into	  purchasing	  the	  things	  advertised,	  even	  when	  we	  
feel	  not	  at	  all	  moved	  to	  buy	  the	  allegedly	  indispensable	  item.	  It	  might	  seem	  natural	  to	  
call	  any	  experience	  of	  exhortation	  an	  experienced	  mandate.	  If	  seeing	  a	  piece	  of	  cake	  
moves	  you	  to	  want	  to	  eat	  it	  when	  you	  weren’t	  even	  hungry	  to	  begin	  with,	  you	  are	  
mobilized	  from	  scratch	  in	  just	  the	  way	  that	  advertisers	  dream	  of.	  But	  advertisers’	  
coercive	  intentions	  of	  to	  generate	  desires	  often	  detectable,	  even	  when	  the	  coercion	  
does	  not	  succeed.	  I	  reserve	  the	  label	  “experienced	  mandate”	  for	  soliciting	  experiences	  
involving	  some	  increment	  of	  motivation	  to	  do	  what	  is	  solicited.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
According	  to	  a	  soliciting	  experience,	  the	  bearer	  of	  the	  affordance	  solicits	  you	  to	  phi,	  and	  
according	  to	  a	  non-­‐soliciting	  experience,	  something	  affords	  phi-­‐ing.	  
8	  I	  thank	  Farid	  Masrour	  for	  this	  example.	  
	   6	  
The	  phenomenal	  aspect	  of	  experienced	  mandates	  whereby	  they	  are	  motivated	  
constitutes	  what	  I’ll	  call	  a	  feeling	  of	  answerability.	  This	  feeling	  also	  normally	  results	  from	  
hearing	  one’s	  name	  called	  or	  from	  meeting	  another	  person’s	  gaze.	  (Given	  the	  
developmental	  importance	  of	  joint	  attention,	  we	  should	  expect	  special	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  
direction	  of	  other	  people’s	  gaze.)	  We	  say	  that	  a	  person	  answers	  to	  one	  name	  but	  not	  to	  
another	  (e.g.,	  “Julia”	  but	  not	  “Julie”).	  To	  “feel	  answerable	  to	  ‘Julia’”	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  
one	  can	  answer	  to	  “Julia”,	  it	  means	  that	  one	  does	  answer	  to	  Julia.	  
	  
	  Like	  answerability	  itself,	  the	  feeling	  of	  answerability	  is	  structurally	  similar	  to	  
responsibility:	  you	  can	  shirk	  a	  responsibility,	  but	  you	  won’t	  thereby	  cease	  to	  be	  
responsible.	  Similarly,	  so	  long	  you	  feel	  answerable	  to	  something,	  even	  ignoring	  it	  is	  a	  
response.	  But	  the	  feeling	  of	  answerability	  falls	  far	  short	  of	  answerability	  itself.	  If	  you	  are	  
answerable	  to	  someone	  else,	  let	  us	  suppose,	  you	  take	  them	  to	  be	  a	  source	  of	  normative	  
constraint	  on	  you.	  In	  feeling	  answerable	  to	  the	  dance	  music’s	  solicitation	  to	  dance,	  or	  to	  
the	  cake’s	  solicitation	  to	  eat	  it,	  you	  do	  not	  thereby	  experience	  the	  music	  or	  the	  cake	  as	  a	  
source	  of	  normative	  constraint	  on	  you.	  	  	  	  
	  
	   We	  can	  zero	  in	  further	  on	  the	  feeling	  of	  answerability	  by	  examining	  delusions	  of	  
reference.9	  Consider	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  experience	  of	  someone	  looking	  at	  you	  
when	  you’re	  in	  the	  same	  room,	  and	  the	  experience	  of	  someone	  on	  television	  looking	  at	  
you	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  camera.	  In	  both	  cases,	  you	  feel	  looked	  at.	  But	  there	  is	  also	  a	  
difference	  that	  is	  brought	  into	  focus	  by	  the	  deluded	  subjects	  who	  assimilate	  both	  cases	  
to	  the	  live	  case.	  In	  such	  delusions,	  a	  subject	  watching	  TV	  feels	  that	  the	  anchorman	  is	  
addressing	  her	  -­‐	  not	  just	  whomever	  might	  be	  listening.	  
What	  do	  the	  deluded	  subjects	  feel,	  when	  they	  feel	  addressed	  by	  the	  anchorman	  
on	  TV?	  They	  feel	  a	  need	  to	  negotiate	  social	  space	  that	  goes	  with	  being	  seen.	  The	  
negotiation	  involves	  unavoidable	  response,	  either	  in	  answering	  or	  ignoring.	  Ignoring	  
someone	  looking	  at	  you	  at	  least	  initially	  often	  feels	  different	  from	  being	  unaware	  of	  
them	  of	  looking	  at	  you.	  The	  deluded	  subject	  feels	  moved	  by	  the	  anchorman	  in	  the	  way	  
that	  others	  normally	  feel	  moved	  only	  by	  other	  people	  who	  are	  in	  the	  same	  immediate	  
surroundings.	  
	  	   When	  the	  cake	  merely	  solicits	  you	  without	  leaving	  you	  feeling	  motivated	  to	  eat	  
it,	  the	  cake	  looks	  as	  if	  it	  is	  to-­‐be-­‐eaten.	  The	  cake	  is	  like	  the	  anchorman,	  talking	  to	  you	  by	  
talking	  to	  whomever	  is	  listening.	  	  In	  contrast,	  when	  the	  cake	  solicits	  you	  in	  a	  way	  that	  
leaves	  you	  feeling	  compelled	  to	  eat	  it,	  the	  cake	  may	  again	  look	  as	  if	  it	  is	  to-­‐be-­‐eaten.	  But	  
in	  addition,	  the	  cake	  is	  like	  a	  person	  looking	  at	  you.	  You	  feel	  answerable	  to	  it,	  the	  way	  
the	  deluded	  subject	  feels	  answerable	  to	  the	  anchorman,	  or	  normals	  feel	  answerable	  to	  
other	  people	  who	  meet	  their	  gaze.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Bortolotti	  (2013)	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We	  can	  contrast	  experienced	  mandates	  with	  another	  superficially	  similar	  but	  
ultimately	  distinct	  phenomenon.	  Suppose	  you	  are	  flying	  in	  an	  airplane	  and	  suddenly	  
realize	  that	  you	  should	  have	  already	  cancelled	  the	  electricity	  service	  at	  your	  previous	  
address,	  and	  must	  do	  it	  as	  soon	  as	  possible.	  It	  can	  seem	  natural	  to	  describe	  your	  
conscious	  state	  at	  this	  moment	  as	  “experiencing	  a	  mandate	  to	  cancel	  your	  electricity	  
service”.	  You	  may	  feel	  poised	  and	  ready	  to	  make	  the	  requisite	  phone	  call,	  just	  as	  soon	  as	  
the	  plane	  lands.	  But	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  your	  immediate	  surroundings	  are	  not	  ones	  in	  
which	  you	  can	  or	  will	  cancel	  your	  electricity	  service	  –	  you	  don’t	  have	  a	  phone,	  it	  
wouldn’t	  work	  anyway	  in	  flight,	  and	  for	  these	  reasons	  you	  don’t	  intend	  to	  call	  until	  later	  
on	  -­‐	  this	  type	  of	  experience	  is	  not	  an	  experienced	  mandate	  in	  our	  sense.	  Whatever	  
feeling	  of	  “mandate”	  you	  may	  have	  in	  this	  situation	  is	  not	  integrated	  into	  the	  situation	  
you’re	  currently	  in.	  It	  has	  no	  dynamic	  that	  unfolds	  in	  that	  situation,	  and	  does	  not	  absorb	  
your	  perceptual	  attention.10	  Whereas	  with	  the	  dance	  music	  you	  were	  solicited	  to	  do	  
something	  but	  not	  motivated	  to	  do	  it,	  here	  you	  are	  motivated	  to	  something,	  without	  
anything	  in	  your	  immediate	  environment	  soliciting	  you	  to	  do	  it.	  Experienced	  mandates	  
involve	  affordances	  by	  the	  perceived	  environment	  that	  you’re	  currently	  in.	  In	  
experienced	  mandates,	  solicitation	  and	  motivation	  go	  together.	  
	  
A	  final	  observation	  about	  experienced	  mandates	  is	  that	  the	  thing	  that	  one	  
experiences	  as	  soliciting	  can	  either	  be	  localized	  in	  an	  object	  (cake,	  hair),	  or	  it	  can	  be	  an	  
entire	  situation.	  Suppose	  you	  are	  alone	  on	  a	  narrow	  sidewalk,	  walking.	  The	  sidewalk	  
affords	  following	  its	  path.	  Then	  someone	  turns	  a	  corner	  and	  begins	  walking	  toward	  you.	  
They	  are	  still	  far	  off,	  and	  no	  one	  else	  is	  in	  between.	  In	  this	  completely	  ordinary	  situation,	  
without	  having	  to	  think	  about	  it	  all,	  you	  assume	  that	  the	  person	  is	  going	  to	  continue	  
walking	  toward	  you	  until	  you	  pass.	  And	  now	  the	  affordance	  of	  travel	  is	  more	  
complicated.	  When	  your	  paths	  cross,	  the	  part	  of	  the	  sidewalk	  traversed	  by	  them	  will	  not	  
be	  passable.	  But	  you	  don’t	  yet	  know	  exactly	  which	  part	  this	  will	  be.	  The	  space	  has	  to	  be	  
negotiated	  by	  adjusting	  your	  relative	  positions.	  Traversing	  the	  sidewalk’s	  path	  is	  
afforded,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  afforded	  simply	  by	  the	  sidewalk.	  It	  is	  afforded	  by	  the	  sidewalk	  
together	  with	  the	  passerby,	  contingent	  on	  their	  cooperation.	  It	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  what	  
form	  the	  cooperation	  will	  take.	  The	  same	  possibilities	  are	  open	  to	  both	  of	  you:	  step	  
aside	  to	  let	  the	  other	  pass,	  or	  continue	  on	  whatever	  path	  they	  open	  up	  for	  you?	  make	  
clear	  gestures	  designed	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  other	  person,	  or	  play	  down	  the	  fact	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  An	  experience	  like	  the	  one	  described	  could	  unfold	  in	  the	  subject’s	  immediate	  
environment,	  if	  the	  subject	  was	  in	  an	  agitated	  state	  in	  which	  everything	  in	  the	  plane	  
came	  to	  look	  like	  an	  obstacle	  to	  making	  the	  crucial	  phone	  call.	  Perhaps	  such	  a	  subject	  
would	  experience	  their	  surroundings	  in	  the	  plane	  as	  anti-­‐affording	  cancelling	  their	  
electricity	  service.	  (In	  principle,	  though	  probably	  not	  in	  fact,	  a	  subject’s	  agitation	  could	  
even	  make	  oblong	  items	  start	  to	  look	  to	  them	  like	  phones).	  But	  to	  create	  an	  illuminating	  
foil	  for	  experienced	  mandates,	  in	  the	  plane	  example	  I’m	  assuming	  that	  the	  subject	  is	  not	  
even	  experiencing	  the	  environment	  as	  either	  affording	  or	  anti-­‐affording	  the	  task	  of	  
cancelling	  their	  electricity	  service.	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there’s	  any	  interaction?	  acknowledge	  any	  adjustment	  they	  make,	  or	  just	  carry	  on?	  
Besides	  these	  possible	  modes	  of	  full	  cooperation,	  there	  is	  also	  the	  possibility	  of	  grudging	  
cooperation,	  borderline	  non-­‐cooperation	  (barely	  move	  out	  of	  the	  way),	  or	  at	  an	  
extreme,	  collision.11	  
	  
So	  experienced	  mandates	  are	  motivated,	  soliciting	  experiences	  of	  affordances	  of	  
things	  in	  the	  immediate	  environment,	  including	  entire	  situations.	  These	  are	  the	  
experiences	  that	  our	  questions	  Q1-­‐Q3	  are	  about.	  
	  
We	  can	  distinguish	  between	  three	  temporal	  relationships	  an	  experience	  can	  bear	  
to	  the	  mandated	  action	  that	  it	  presents.	  First,	  one	  might	  experience	  as	  mandatory	  an	  
action	  not	  yet	  undertaken.	  Second,	  one	  might	  experience	  as	  mandatory	  an	  action	  now	  
being	  completed	  as	  mandated.	  Third,	  one	  might	  retrospectively	  experience	  as	  having	  
been	  mandated	  an	  action	  just	  completed.	  
	  
These	  relations	  form	  a	  dynamic	  phenomenon,	  which	  can	  be	  described	  as	  
sequence	  of	  experiences.	  I’ll	  describe	  them	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  action	  A:	  
	  	  
(i)	  an	  experience	  of:	  A	  being	  such	  that	  you	  must	  undertake	  it,	  because	  the	  
immediate	  situation	  demands	  it.	  
(ii)	  an	  experience	  of:	  being	  about	  to	  undertake	  A,	  because	  the	  immediate	  
situation	  demands	  it.	  
(iii)	  an	  experience	  of:	  now	  carrying	  out	  A,	  because	  the	  immediate	  situation	  
demanded	  it.	  
	  
In	  experience	  (i),	  you	  experience	  the	  mandate	  without	  executing	  the	  mandated	  action	  
right	  then	  and	  there	  –	  before	  executing	  it,	  or	  without	  ever	  executing	  it.12	  In	  principle,	  a	  
situation	  could	  present	  the	  same	  affordance	  as	  mandated,	  first	  in	  way	  (i)	  and	  then	  
subsequently	  in	  ways	  (ii)	  and	  (iii).	  	  But	  we	  shouldn’t	  assimilate	  (i)	  to	  an	  anticipation	  of	  
executing	  the	  action.	  Just	  as	  you	  might	  receive	  a	  mandate	  from	  someone	  else	  that	  you	  
go	  on	  to	  ignore,	  so	  too	  you	  might	  experience	  a	  potential	  action	  (such	  as	  moving	  the	  hair	  
aside)	  as	  mandatory	  in	  way	  (i),	  without	  going	  on	  to	  execute	  it,	  though	  possibly	  only	  at	  
the	  cost	  of	  some	  dissonance.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  These	  possibilities	  are	  made	  vivid	  in	  T.G.	  Seuss’s	  story	  The	  Zax,	  in	  which	  a	  north-­‐going	  
Zax	  and	  a	  south-­‐going	  Zax	  are	  stopped	  in	  their	  tracks	  because	  neither	  will	  move	  out	  of	  
the	  other’s	  way.	  
12	  Kelly	  (2006)	  suggests	  that	  experiences	  characterized	  in	  (i)	  are	  typical	  in	  perceiving	  
shape	  and	  color	  constancies.	  In	  perceiving	  the	  color	  or	  shape	  of	  something,	  he	  argues,	  
we	  are	  sensitive	  to	  an	  optimal	  point	  from	  which	  it	  could	  be	  viewed.	  He	  does	  not	  claim,	  
however,	  that	  every	  experience	  of	  perceptual	  constancies	  is	  one	  in	  which	  we	  actually	  
optimize	  our	  bodily	  position	  viz	  a	  viz	  the	  thing	  we’re	  seeing.	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I’m	  going	  to	  use	  “experienced	  mandates”	  to	  denote	  dynamic	  experiences	  
spanning	  types	  (i)-­‐(iii).	  But	  in	  discussing	  how	  experienced	  mandates	  relate	  to	  
representation,	  I’ll	  focus	  mainly	  on	  experiences	  of	  type	  (i).	  	  	  
	  	  
	  
2.	  How	  experienced	  mandates	  challenge	  the	  centrality	  of	  representation	  in	  perception	  
	  	  
Due	  to	  their	  combination	  of	  solicitation	  and	  motivation,	  experienced	  mandates	  
are	  better	  candidates	  for	  showing	  representation	  in	  perceptual	  experience	  to	  be	  
explanatorily	  dispensable,	  compared	  to	  experiences	  of	  non-­‐soliciting	  affordances,	  or	  
experiences	  of	  proto-­‐affordances,	  or	  experiences	  that	  don’t	  involve	  affordances	  at	  all.	  	  
	  
In	  an	  experienced	  mandate,	  the	  current	  situation	  seems	  to	  determine	  the	  
subsequent	  one.	  Since	  the	  subsequent	  situation	  seems	  already	  to	  be	  on	  the	  way	  when	  
one	  has	  the	  current	  experience,	  one	  might	  think	  there	  is	  no	  need	  for	  the	  current	  
experience	  to	  represent	  the	  possibility	  of	  acting	  in	  the	  way	  the	  situation	  mandates,	  and	  
more	  generally,	  no	  need	  for	  experiential	  representations	  to	  guide	  the	  subject	  in	  
planning	  and	  executing	  the	  mandated	  action.	  With	  both	  solicitation	  and	  motivation	  built	  
in	  to	  experienced	  mandates,	  it	  might	  seem	  natural	  to	  assimilate	  these	  experiences	  to	  
action	  that	  is	  fueled	  by	  dynamic	  interaction	  with	  the	  environment.	  	  
	  
We	  find	  something	  like	  this	  challenge	  in	  Dreyfus’s	  description	  of	  experienced	  
mandates.	  He	  does	  not	  discuss	  such	  experiences	  under	  that	  description,	  but	  he	  uses	  the	  
metaphor	  of	  solicitation	  to	  describe	  them.	  At	  the	  start	  of	  one	  of	  his	  many	  discussions	  of	  
skillful	  action,	  Dreyfus	  connects	  the	  central	  behaviorist	  idea	  that	  representations	  are	  not	  
needed	  to	  mediate	  between	  the	  environment	  and	  behavior	  to	  Merleau-­‐Ponty’s	  notion	  
of	  the	  “intentional	  arc”:	  
	  
Existential	  phenomenologists	  hold	  that	  the	  two	  most	  basic	  forms	  of	  intelligent	  
behavior,	  learning,	  and	  skillful	  action,	  can	  be	  described	  and	  explained	  without	  
recourse	  to	  mind	  or	  brain	  representations….	  The	  intentional	  arc	  names	  the	  tight	  
connection	  between	  the	  agent	  and	  the	  world,	  viz.	  that,	  as	  the	  agent	  acquires	  skills,	  
these	  skills	  are	  “stored”,	  not	  as	  representations	  in	  the	  mind,	  but	  as	  more	  and	  more	  
refined	  dispositions	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  solicitations	  of	  more	  and	  more	  refined	  
perceptions	  of	  the	  current	  situation.	  Maximum	  grip	  names	  the	  body’s	  tendency	  
to	  respond	  to	  these	  solicitations	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  bring	  the	  current	  situation	  
closer	  to	  the	  agent’s	  sense	  of	  an	  optimal	  gestalt.	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  neither	  of	  these	  
abilities	  requires	  mental	  or	  brain	  representations.	  (p.	  1)	  
	  
(I’ve	  highlighted	  the	  part	  about	  solicitations).	  In	  further	  explicating	  the	  kind	  of	  
solicitation	  involved	  in	  Merleau-­‐Ponty’s	  notion	  of	  the	  intentional	  arc,	  Dreyfus	  appeals	  to	  
the	  idea	  that	  skilled	  action	  is	  guided	  by	  a	  feeling	  of	  “tension”	  that	  tracks	  the	  status	  of	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the	  situation	  relative	  to	  one’s	  goal:13	  Dreyfus	  suggests	  that	  when	  a	  feeling	  of	  tension	  is	  
sensitive	  to	  one’s	  goal,	  it	  might	  obviate	  any	  need	  for	  representations	  to	  guide	  one’s	  
responses	  to	  the	  environment.	  	  
	  
“In	  our	  skilled	  activity	  we	  move	  to	  achieve	  a	  better	  and	  better	  grip	  on	  our	  
situation.	  For	  this	  movement	  towards	  maximum	  grip	  to	  take	  place,	  one	  does	  not	  
need	  a	  mental	  representation	  of	  one’s	  goal.	  Rather,	  acting	  is	  experienced	  as	  a	  
steady	  flow	  of	  skillful	  activity	  in	  response	  to	  one's	  sense	  of	  the	  situation.	  Part	  of	  
that	  experience	  is	  a	  sense	  that	  when	  one's	  situation	  deviates	  from	  some	  optimal	  
body-­‐environment	  relationship,	  one's	  activity	  takes	  one	  closer	  to	  that	  optimum	  
and	  thereby	  relieves	  the	  "tension"	  of	  the	  deviation.	  One	  does	  not	  need	  to	  know	  
what	  that	  optimum	  is.	  One's	  body	  is	  simply	  solicited	  by	  the	  situation	  to	  get	  into	  
equilibrium	  with	  it.”	  (p.	  12)	  
	  
Dreyfus	  illustrates	  further	  by	  discussing	  tennis:	  
	  
[C]onsider	  a	  tennis	  swing.	  If	  one	  is	  a	  beginner	  or	  is	  off	  one's	  form	  one	  might	  find	  
oneself	  making	  an	  effort	  to	  keep	  one's	  eye	  on	  the	  ball,	  keep	  the	  racket	  
perpendicular	  to	  the	  court,	  hit	  the	  ball	  squarely,	  etc.	  But	  if	  one	  is	  expert	  at	  the	  
game,	  things	  are	  going	  well,	  and	  one	  is	  absorbed	  in	  the	  game,	  what	  one	  
experiences	  is	  more	  like	  one's	  arm	  going	  up	  and	  its	  being	  drawn	  to	  the	  appropriate	  
position,	  the	  racket	  forming	  the	  optimal	  angle	  with	  the	  court	  -­‐-­‐	  an	  angle	  one	  need	  
not	  even	  be	  aware	  of	  -­‐-­‐	  all	  this	  so	  as	  to	  complete	  the	  gestalt	  made	  up	  of	  the	  court,	  
one's	  running	  opponent,	  and	  the	  oncoming	  ball.	  One	  feels	  that	  one's	  
comportment	  was	  caused	  by	  the	  perceived	  conditions	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  reduce	  a	  
sense	  of	  deviation	  from	  some	  satisfactory	  gestalt.	  But	  that	  final	  gestalt	  need	  not	  
be	  represented	  in	  one's	  mind.	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  not	  something	  one	  could	  represent.	  
One	  only	  senses	  when	  one	  is	  getting	  closer	  or	  further	  away	  from	  the	  optimum.	  
(“Intelligence	  without	  Representation”)	  
	  
Now,	  much	  of	  what	  we	  do	  is	  in	  a	  broad	  sense	  skilled	  action	  -­‐	  a	  fact	  easily	  
observed	  by	  watching	  toddlers	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  learning	  how	  to	  open	  doors	  or	  put	  on	  
their	  shoes.	  In	  contrast,	  Dreyfus	  focuses	  on	  specialized	  skilled	  action	  (tennis),	  rather	  
than	  on	  sensory-­‐motor	  habits	  that	  nearly	  everyone	  eventually	  develops	  (tying	  shoes,	  
opening	  doors).	  But	  experienced	  mandates	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  sensory-­‐
motor	  habits	  as	  well.	  In	  the	  passerby	  example,	  one	  can	  imagine	  feeling	  that	  stepping	  
aside	  to	  let	  the	  other	  person	  pass	  is	  mandatory,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  among	  the	  possible	  
modes	  of	  passing	  another	  person	  on	  the	  path,	  moving	  aside	  to	  let	  the	  other	  person	  pass	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  The	  notion	  of	  tension	  comes	  from	  Merleau-­‐Ponty,	  who	  uses	  it	  in	  Phenomenology	  of	  
Perception	  to	  describe	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  perceptual	  constancies.	  He	  writes	  “The	  
distance	  from	  me	  to	  the	  object	  is	  not	  a	  size	  which	  increases	  or	  decreases,	  but	  a	  tension	  
which	  fluctuates	  around	  a	  norm.”	  Quoted	  in	  Kelly	  (2010).	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is	  the	  only	  one	  experienced	  as	  possible,	  and	  in	  that	  sense,	  mandatory.	  The	  type	  of	  
mandate	  can	  vary	  with	  the	  situation.	  Perhaps	  the	  passerby	  is	  frail,	  or	  moves	  only	  with	  
difficulty,	  and	  the	  felt	  mandate	  stems	  from	  moral	  sensitivity.14	  Or	  perhaps	  one	  has	  
cultivated	  a	  habit	  of	  always	  letting	  the	  other	  person	  pass,	  out	  of	  politeness,	  or	  because	  
one	  enjoys	  determining	  how	  such	  micro-­‐interactions	  with	  the	  public	  unfold.	  Here	  too,	  
the	  mandatory	  aspect	  stems	  not	  from	  specialized	  motor	  skill,	  but	  from	  a	  broadly	  social	  
sensitivity.	  In	  yet	  other	  cases	  the	  felt	  mandate	  might	  be	  broadly	  aesthetic,	  as	  it	  is	  in	  the	  
example	  involving	  the	  tuft	  of	  your	  interlocutor’s	  hair	  that	  falls	  just	  in	  front	  of	  their	  left	  
eye,	  making	  it	  harder	  to	  read	  their	  expression,	  and	  producing	  in	  you	  a	  strong	  impulse	  to	  
move	  the	  hair	  out	  of	  the	  way.	  Or	  in	  an	  exhausted	  state,	  a	  fluffy	  bed	  in	  an	  empty	  room	  
might	  be	  experienced	  as	  inviting	  you	  to	  plop	  down	  on	  it	  for	  rest.	  The	  felt	  mandate	  does	  
not	  come	  from	  specialized	  skilled	  action	  or	  its	  dynamics	  of	  execution	  in	  any	  of	  these	  
examples.	  
	  
	  	   The	  challenge	  posed	  by	  experienced	  mandates	  to	  the	  primacy	  of	  representation	  
is	  potentially	  quite	  powerful.	  Experienced	  mandates	  pervade	  much	  of	  our	  conscious	  
lives,	  arising	  both	  in	  habitual	  action	  and	  in	  specialized	  skilled	  action.	  	  In	  light	  of	  the	  
broad	  challenge,	  let	  us	  ask:	  what	  is	  the	  relationship	  between	  experienced	  mandates	  and	  
representation?	  	  
	  	  	  
Part	  II.	  Experienced	  mandates	  and	  representation	  
	  
3.	  Do	  experienced	  mandates	  have	  contents?	  
	   We	  can	  begin	  our	  inquiry	  into	  this	  relationship	  by	  asking	  whether	  experienced	  
mandates	  are	  experiences	  with	  accuracy	  conditions,	  where	  the	  accuracy	  conditions	  
characterize	  how	  the	  environment	  seems	  to	  the	  subject	  to	  be.	  If	  an	  experience	  has	  
accuracy	  conditions,	  then	  it	  is	  accurate	  only	  if	  those	  conditions	  are	  satisfied.	  When	  
questions	  Q1-­‐Q3	  ask	  about	  the	  role	  of	  representational	  contents	  in	  experienced	  
mandates,	  they	  are	  asking	  about	  the	  kind	  of	  accuracy	  condition	  that	  would	  characterize	  
the	  experience	  from	  the	  subject’s	  point	  of	  view.	  Discerning	  just	  which	  accuracy	  
conditions	  do	  that	  is	  no	  small	  task.	  15	  But	  some	  candidates	  naturally	  suggest	  themselves.	  
For	  instance,	  if	  an	  experience	  of	  a	  tennis	  ball	  hurtling	  toward	  you	  has	  an	  accuracy	  
condition,	  it	  might	  include	  the	  condition	  that	  the	  ball	  is	  green	  and	  coming	  toward	  you.	  A	  
preliminary	  question,	  however,	  is	  whether	  experiences	  have	  any	  representational	  
contents	  at	  all.	  And	  a	  version	  of	  that	  question	  concerns	  experienced	  mandates:	  
	  	  	   	  
Q1.	  Do	  experienced	  mandates	  have	  any	  representational	  contents?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  In	  an	  excellent	  discussion	  of	  similar	  phenomena,	  Bengson	  (in	  progress),	  following	  
Mandelbaum	  (1969)	  discusses	  an	  example	  of	  this	  sort,	  where	  someone	  gives	  up	  their	  
seat	  on	  the	  bus	  to	  someone	  else	  who	  is	  visibly	  tired.	  	  	  	  	  
15	  We	  can’t	  read	  off	  directly	  from	  introspection	  which	  contents	  experiences	  have.	  For	  
discussion,	  see	  Siegel	  2010,	  chapter	  4.	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So	  far,	  I	  have	  glossed	  over	  the	  exact	  relationship	  that	  experienced	  mandates	  bear	  to	  
perceptual	  experience,	  leaving	  open	  that	  they	  might	  simply	  be	  perceptual	  experiences,	  
or	  alternatively	  they	  might	  have	  perceptual	  experiences	  as	  components.	  It	  seems	  
obvious	  that	  perceptual	  experiences	  are	  related	  to	  experienced	  mandates	  in	  one	  of	  
these	  two	  ways.	  You	  couldn’t	  very	  well	  play	  tennis	  without	  seeing	  the	  ball,	  or	  seek	  
protection	  by	  entering	  a	  forest	  without	  perceiving	  where	  the	  forest	  is	  in	  relation	  to	  you.	  	  
	  
	   The	  central	  observation	  favoring	  the	  idea	  that	  perceptual	  experiences	  in	  
experienced	  mandates	  are	  contentless	  is	  that	  the	  subject	  feels	  immediately	  solicited	  by	  
their	  environment	  in	  ways	  that	  move	  them	  to	  action.	  There	  might	  then	  seem	  to	  be	  no	  
explanatory	  role	  for	  contents	  of	  experience	  to	  play.	  	  	  
	  
In	  reply,	  the	  fact	  that	  while	  acting	  easily	  in	  an	  environment,	  one	  is	  seemingly	  
propelled	  by	  it	  does	  not	  undermine	  the	  general	  considerations	  about	  perception	  that	  
suggest	  that	  such	  experiences	  have	  contents.	  Consider	  the	  case	  of	  visual	  experiences,	  
since	  all	  of	  our	  examples	  involve	  vision.	  According	  to	  the	  Content	  View,	  all	  visual	  
perceptual	  experiences	  have	  contents.	  The	  central	  motivation	  for	  the	  Content	  View	  is	  
phenomenological.	  When	  you	  see	  things,	  they	  look	  to	  you	  to	  be	  a	  certain	  way.	  And	  
when	  they	  look	  to	  you	  to	  be	  a	  certain	  way,	  they	  look	  to	  have	  certain	  properties.	  I	  won’t	  
repeat	  a	  full	  defense	  (given	  elsewhere)	  of	  the	  Content	  View	  here,	  but	  the	  key	  transition	  
in	  that	  defense	  moves	  from	  ‘X	  looks	  to	  have	  property	  F’	  to	  ‘The	  experience	  of	  X’s	  having	  
F	  is	  accurate	  only	  if	  X	  has	  F’.16	  
	  
On	  the	  starting	  point	  of	  the	  transition,	  the	  fact	  that	  Dreyfus’s	  tennis	  player	  can	  
so	  easily	  navigate	  the	  tennis	  court	  does	  not	  entail	  that	  the	  things	  the	  player	  sees	  on	  the	  
court	  –	  the	  player,	  the	  oncoming	  ball,	  the	  spaces	  between	  himself	  and	  net	  –	  fail	  to	  look	  
any	  way	  to	  her	  at	  all.	  Without	  seeing	  the	  tennis	  court,	  it	  would	  be	  hard	  to	  play	  tennis	  
and	  hard	  to	  perceive	  the	  gestalt	  to	  be	  completed.	  As	  Dreyfus	  observes,	  in	  the	  
experience	  of	  playing	  tennis,	  there	  are	  some	  “perceived	  conditions”	  in	  response	  to	  
which	  one	  adjusts	  one’s	  movement.	  Since	  the	  adjustments	  are	  made	  to	  “complete	  the	  
gestalt”	  of	  the	  tennis	  game,	  these	  perceived	  conditions	  presumably	  include	  the	  
components	  of	  the	  gestalt,	  such	  as	  the	  positions	  of	  the	  opponent	  and	  the	  ball.	  Which	  
ways	  these	  things	  look	  will	  depend	  on	  many	  factors,	  including	  what	  you’re	  doing	  –	  such	  
as	  whether	  you’re	  playing	  the	  game,	  watching	  the	  players,	  or	  studying	  the	  court	  in	  order	  
to	  draw	  it.	  But	  if	  the	  court,	  or	  the	  things	  in	  it,	  or	  the	  situation	  on	  the	  court	  didn’t	  look	  
any	  way	  to	  you	  at	  all,	  then	  you	  would	  not	  be	  seeing	  them.	  (Even	  if	  you	  are	  hallucinating	  
rather	  than	  seeing,	  the	  same	  basic	  phenomenological	  point	  holds.)	  	  
	  
	   In	  all	  of	  these	  cases,	  properties	  characterize	  the	  way	  things	  look	  to	  us,	  when	  we	  
see	  them.	  And	  if	  things	  look	  to	  have	  certain	  properties,	  then,	  it	  seems,	  the	  experience	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Siegel	  2010	  Chapter	  2.	  
	   13	  
accurate,	  only	  if	  things	  have	  the	  properties	  that	  they	  look	  to	  have.	  Of	  course	  positive	  
reason	  is	  needed	  to	  think	  that	  in	  general,	  when	  things	  you	  see	  look	  to	  you	  to	  have	  
certain	  properties,	  the	  experience	  are	  accurate	  only	  if	  the	  things	  are	  the	  way	  they	  look.	  	  
A	  full	  defense	  of	  this	  transition	  is	  the	  core	  of	  my	  case	  for	  the	  Content	  View.	  What’s	  
important	  here	  is	  that	  nothing	  specific	  to	  experienced	  mandates	  forces	  any	  departure	  
from	  the	  starting	  point	  of	  this	  general	  argument.	  	  
	  
	  	   Although	  it	  may	  seem	  obvious	  from	  our	  examples	  so	  far	  that	  experienced	  
mandates	  involve	  perceptual	  experiences,	  different	  examples	  might	  call	  this	  assumption	  
into	  question.	  And	  if	  there	  are	  experienced	  mandates	  that	  extinguish	  all	  perceptual	  
experiences	  as	  they	  unfold,	  then	  a	  fortiori	  no	  contentful	  perceptual	  experiences	  would	  
play	  any	  important	  role	  analyzing	  experienced	  mandates.	  That	  result	  would	  open	  the	  
possibility	  of	  denying	  that	  experienced	  mandates	  have	  representational	  contents,	  
challenging	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  Content	  View	  while	  tolerating	  its	  truth.	  	  
	  
	   One	  might	  hypothesize	  that	  the	  extinction	  of	  perceptual	  experiences	  is	  a	  special	  
case	  of	  an	  ordinary	  occurrence,	  in	  which	  we	  exercise	  skills	  or	  habits	  without	  much	  
guidance,	  if	  any,	  from	  perceptual	  experience.	  So	  it	  is	  worth	  considering	  whether	  some	  
experienced	  mandates	  plausibly	  extinguish	  perceptual	  experiences	  we	  may	  start	  out	  
having	  in	  earlier	  stages	  of	  habit	  or	  skill-­‐formation,	  but	  which	  fade	  out	  completely	  by	  the	  
time	  the	  habit	  or	  skill	  is	  well-­‐established.	  Perhaps	  in	  some	  such	  cases,	  we	  form	  beliefs	  
about	  what’s	  around	  us,	  without	  basing	  those	  beliefs	  on	  any	  experience.	  One	  often	  
doesn’t	  need	  to	  look	  carefully,	  or	  at	  all,	  to	  see	  where	  to	  reach	  for	  a	  familiar	  doorknob,	  
because	  one’s	  body	  ‘knows’	  already,	  out	  of	  sensory-­‐motor	  habit,	  or	  thanks	  to	  
unconscious	  visual	  processing	  in	  the	  dorsal	  stream.17	  	  
	   	  
	   Could	  we	  be	  solicited	  by	  the	  environment	  without	  perceptual	  experience?	  Let	  us	  
grant	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  argument	  that	  we	  could.	  Perhaps	  actions	  such	  as	  stuffing	  a	  tennis	  
racket	  back	  into	  its	  case	  are	  sometimes	  completed	  without	  much	  need	  for	  perceptual	  
experience	  at	  all.	  The	  same	  might	  be	  true	  of	  belief:	  one	  might	  believe	  that	  the	  racket	  is	  
back	  in	  the	  case,	  without	  any	  conscious	  experience	  or	  memory	  of	  putting	  it	  there	  or	  
seeing	  it	  slip	  in.	  It	  is	  uncontroversial	  that	  such	  actions	  proceed	  without	  deliberation.	  
Might	  they	  proceed	  without	  experience	  as	  well?	  If	  experienced	  mandates	  can	  extinguish	  
perceptual	  experiences,	  then	  even	  if	  all	  such	  experiences	  have	  content	  (as	  per	  the	  
Content	  View),	  the	  Content	  View	  would	  not	  illuminate	  the	  role	  of	  perception	  in	  action	  
or	  belief	  in	  cases	  of	  experienced	  mandates.	  	  	  
	  
	  	   But	  there	  is	  little	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  experienced	  mandates	  extinguish	  
perceptual	  experiences.	  It	  is	  one	  thing	  for	  motor	  habits	  to	  carry	  you	  through	  the	  actions	  
of	  putting	  away	  the	  racket,	  or	  stepping	  aside	  so	  that	  the	  oncoming	  person	  can	  pass	  you	  
on	  the	  narrow	  sidewalk,	  so	  that	  these	  aspects	  of	  your	  perceptual	  experience	  become	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Milner	  and	  Goodale	  (1995)	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highly	  inattentive	  and	  inaccessible	  to	  memory.	  It	  is	  something	  else	  for	  sensory-­‐motor	  
habits	  to	  blip	  out	  all	  surrounding	  perceptual	  experience,	  or	  for	  stepping	  aside	  to	  prevent	  
you	  from	  consciously	  seeing	  the	  oncoming	  passer-­‐by	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  scene	  at	  all.	  If	  
such	  occurrences	  were	  normal,	  our	  conscious	  lives	  would	  be	  interrupted	  with	  waking	  
but	  blank	  durations,	  like	  seizures	  sprinkled	  throughout	  the	  day,	  triggered	  by	  habitual	  
actions	  like	  putting	  away	  a	  tennis	  racket,	  filling	  up	  one’s	  tea	  kettle,	  or	  opening	  the	  
mailbox.	  The	  habit-­‐discontinuity	  thesis	  (HD)	  is	  that	  such	  discontinuities	  occur	  on	  a	  
regular	  basis	  with	  habitual	  actions.	  	  
	  
The	  HD	  thesis	  predicts	  that	  we	  could	  never	  take	  in	  novel	  stimuli	  at	  the	  level	  of	  
experience	  or	  notice	  anything	  unusual	  while	  completing	  habitual	  actions	  –	  actions	  that	  
presumably	  don’t	  use	  up	  much	  attention.	  Since	  habitual	  actions	  would	  seem	  to	  free	  up	  
attention	  rather	  than	  expending	  it,	  this	  prediction	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  false,	  if	  the	  usual	  moral	  
drawn	  from	  inattentional	  blindness	  experiments	  are	  correct.	  The	  usual	  moral	  is	  that	  
draining	  our	  overall	  attentional	  resources	  with	  a	  demanding	  visual	  task	  that	  reduces	  our	  
capacity	  for	  experience,	  or	  our	  capacity	  to	  remember	  it.	  	  
	  
	  	   The	  HD	  thesis	  also	  predicts	  that	  most	  of	  the	  time	  when	  we	  reflect	  afterward	  on	  
whether	  anything	  was	  visible	  to	  us	  while	  we	  were	  completing	  such	  actions,	  we	  would	  
find	  that	  our	  memories	  were	  blank.	  It	  seems	  plain	  that	  this	  prediction	  is	  wrong.	  It’s	  a	  
familiar	  occurrence	  that	  we	  complete	  a	  habitual	  action,	  realize	  afterward	  we	  were	  
paying	  little	  attention	  to	  what	  we	  were	  doing,	  and	  yet	  can	  still	  remember	  how	  other	  
parts	  of	  the	  scene	  looked	  as	  we	  were	  completing	  it.	  You	  might	  not	  realize	  that	  you	  were	  
sliding	  the	  tennis	  racket	  back	  into	  its	  case,	  or	  adjusting	  your	  position	  on	  a	  path	  to	  let	  
other	  pass	  more	  easily,	  yet	  plainly	  these	  inattentive	  actions	  are	  sometimes	  accompanied	  
by	  your	  noticing	  the	  sunset	  or	  hearing	  that	  the	  passer-­‐bys	  were	  speaking	  German.	  	  
	  	   	  	  
	   So	  far,	  I’ve	  argued	  that	  experienced	  mandates	  provide	  no	  special	  reason	  to	  back	  
away	  from	  the	  standard	  reasons	  to	  think	  that	  perceptual	  experiences	  have	  contents.	  
Against	  the	  assumption	  that	  perceptual	  experiences	  have	  contents,	  do	  any	  of	  these	  
contents	  pertain	  especially	  to	  the	  felt	  mandate?	  This	  question	  is	  sharpened	  in	  the	  form	  
of	  Q2.	  
	  
Q2.	  Do	  experienced	  mandates	  have	  any	  representational	  contents	  relevant	  to	  explaining	  
why	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  the	  subject	  to	  perform	  the	  action	  she	  experiences	  as	  mandated?	  	  
	  
	   Let’s	  say	  that	  a	  content	  of	  an	  experienced	  mandate	  is	  explanatorily	  relevant,	  if	  it	  
is	  relevant	  to	  explaining	  why	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  the	  subject	  to	  perform	  the	  action	  that	  
she	  experiences	  as	  mandated.	  For	  instance,	  in	  the	  hair	  case,	  if	  the	  subject	  moves	  the	  
hair	  out	  of	  the	  way,	  then	  the	  content	  “hair	  is	  front	  of	  eyes”	  and	  “hair	  is	  to-­‐be-­‐moved”	  
would	  be	  explanatorily	  relevant.	  This	  notion	  of	  explanatory	  relevance	  is	  considerably	  
loose,	  but	  we	  won’t	  need	  more	  precision	  in	  order	  to	  address	  Q2.	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We	  can	  distinguish	  between	  two	  kinds	  of	  properties	  that	  the	  component	  
perceptual	  experiences	  might	  represent,	  and	  then	  consider	  whether	  contents	  involving	  
each	  kind	  of	  property	  are	  explanatorily	  relevant.	  
	  
First,	  the	  content	  could	  involve	  properties	  that	  rationalize	  the	  mandated	  action.	  
This	  notion	  is	  best	  introduced	  through	  examples.	  When	  the	  interlocutor’s	  hair	  looks	  to	  
be	  covering	  one	  eye,	  it	  mandates	  adjustment.	  When	  the	  bed	  looks	  fluffy,	  it	  mandates	  
plopping	  down	  on	  it.	  When	  the	  forest	  looks	  canopied,	  it	  mandates	  entering	  the	  forest.	  
The	  ways	  the	  hair,	  the	  bed	  and	  the	  forest	  look	  in	  these	  examples	  (covering	  one	  eye,	  
fluffy,	  canopied)	  are	  rationalizing	  properties,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  those	  things	  
have	  those	  properties	  makes	  the	  action	  involved	  in	  the	  mandate	  straightforwardly	  
intelligible.	  Adjusting	  the	  hair	  is	  intelligible	  if	  the	  hair	  covers	  an	  eye,	  plopping	  down	  on	  
the	  bed	  is	  intelligible	  if	  it	  is	  fluffy,	  seeking	  protection	  in	  the	  forest	  is	  intelligible	  if	  the	  
forest	  is	  canopied.	  If	  rationalizing	  properties	  figured	  in	  the	  accuracy	  conditions	  of	  these	  
examples,	  then	  experiences	  would	  be	  accurate	  only	  if:	  the	  hair	  covers	  the	  eye,	  the	  bed	  is	  
fluffy,	  the	  forest	  is	  canopied.	  	  	  
	  
	   Second,	  the	  content	  could	  involve	  properties	  that	  don’t	  rationalize	  the	  mandated	  
action.	  For	  instance,	  the	  ball	  is	  green,	  the	  hair	  is	  blonde,	  the	  forest	  trees	  are	  swaying	  in	  
the	  wind.	  In	  these	  examples,	  the	  properties	  green,	  blonde,	  and	  swaying	  are	  non-­‐
rationalizing.	  In	  an	  experimental	  setting,	  one	  might	  operationalize	  the	  notion	  of	  non-­‐
rationalizing	  properties	  as	  task-­‐irrelevant	  information.	  Let	  us	  begin	  with	  these	  non-­‐
rationalizing	  properties	  and	  ask	  whether	  contents	  involving	  them	  are	  explanatorily	  
relevant,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  Q2	  asks	  about.	  	  
	  
	   Consider	  Dreyfus’s	  example	  of	  a	  chessmaster	  playing	  lightning	  chess,	  in	  which	  
there	  is	  barely	  time	  to	  look	  at	  the	  board	  before	  the	  next	  move	  rearranges	  the	  pieces	  on	  
it.	  How	  does	  the	  chessboard	  look	  to	  such	  a	  player?	  Dreyfus	  suggests	  that	  at	  the	  very	  
least	  the	  master	  sees	  patterns	  of	  pieces	  on	  the	  board,	  even	  if	  their	  expertise	  leaves	  
them	  with	  no	  need	  to	  reason	  explicitly	  from	  those	  patterns	  to	  the	  next	  move:	  
	  
After	  responding	  to	  an	  estimated	  million	  specific	  chess	  positions	  in	  the	  process	  
of	  becoming	  a	  chess	  master,	  the	  master	  confronted	  with	  a	  new	  position,	  
spontaneously	  does	  something	  similar	  to	  what	  has	  previously	  worked,	  and	  lo	  and	  
behold,	  it	  usually	  works.	  In	  general,	  instead	  of	  relying	  on	  rules	  and	  standards	  to	  
decide	  on	  or	  to	  justify	  her	  actions,	  the	  expert	  immediately	  responds	  to	  the	  
current	  concrete	  situation….When	  the	  Grandmaster	  is	  playing	  lightning	  chess,	  as	  
far	  as	  he	  can	  tell,	  he	  is	  simply	  responding	  to	  the	  patterns	  on	  the	  board.	  At	  this	  
speed	  he	  must	  depend	  entirely	  on	  perception	  and	  not	  at	  all	  on	  analysis	  and	  
comparison	  of	  alternatives.	  18	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Dreyfus	  2005,	  p.8	  of	  web	  version.	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The	  chessboard	  looks	  to	  have	  its	  pieces	  positioned	  in	  a	  certain	  way.	  	  Perhaps	  only	  the	  
relevant	  pieces	  appear	  any	  way	  to	  the	  chessmaster,	  and	  the	  pieces	  she	  knows	  to	  be	  
irrelevant	  to	  that	  stage	  of	  the	  game	  are	  attentionally	  suppressed.19	  Different	  parts	  of	  
the	  board	  are	  presumably	  salient	  to	  the	  chessmaster	  than	  would	  be	  salient	  to	  the	  novice	  
in	  those	  extremely	  brief	  periods	  between	  chess	  moves.	  The	  chessmaster’s	  expertise	  
might	  reduce	  the	  level	  of	  attentiveness	  to	  the	  overall	  state	  of	  the	  board,	  without	  going	  
so	  far	  as	  to	  extinguish	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  board	  altogether.	  If	  so,	  the	  experienced	  
mandate	  would	  structure	  the	  perceiver’s	  attention,	  but	  wouldn’t	  be	  systematically	  
related	  to	  the	  contents	  of	  component	  perceptual	  experience,	  in	  the	  way	  that	  
rationalizing	  properties	  rationalizing	  mandated	  action.	  
	  
	   By	  hypothesis,	  subjects	  of	  experienced	  mandates	  experience	  themselves	  as	  
being	  pushed	  forward	  from	  one	  moment	  to	  the	  next	  by	  the	  situation	  they’re	  in.	  One	  
might	  think	  this	  makes	  non-­‐rationalizing	  contents	  of	  experience	  dispensable	  in	  guiding	  
action.	  But	  that	  thought	  seems	  mistaken.	  Even	  if	  the	  mandates	  afforded	  to	  the	  
chessmasters,	  for	  example,	  have	  no	  systematic	  impact	  on	  the	  contents	  of	  their	  
experience,	  it	  is	  implausible	  to	  suppose	  that	  a	  chessmaster	  could	  play	  lightning	  chess	  
without	  experiencing	  the	  board	  at	  all.	  By	  Dreyfus’s	  own	  description,	  the	  chessmaster	  
“depends	  entirely	  on	  perception”	  in	  playing	  the	  game.	  Their	  experiences	  of	  the	  board	  
seem	  indispensable	  in	  guiding	  their	  action,	  or	  in	  explaining	  why	  the	  action	  makes	  sense	  
to	  them,	  even	  if	  they	  are	  not	  rationalized	  in	  any	  way	  that	  we	  or	  they	  could	  reconstruct	  
from	  the	  nonrationalizing	  contents.	  	  	  
	   	  
	   Turning	  to	  contents	  that	  involve	  rationalizing	  properties,	  it	  might	  seem	  obvious	  
that	  these	  properties	  play	  an	  explanatorily	  role	  in	  making	  the	  action	  seem	  appropriate	  
to	  the	  subject.	  But	  the	  role	  of	  such	  contents	  in	  an	  experienced	  mandate	  could	  differ,	  
depending	  on	  the	  direction	  of	  explanatory	  priority.	  In	  the	  content-­‐first	  direction,	  you	  
experience	  the	  mandate	  (move	  the	  hair,	  hit	  the	  ball	  back,	  enter	  the	  forest,	  etc),	  because	  
the	  component	  perceptual	  experience	  represents	  the	  rationalizing	  property.	  Here	  the	  
forest	  mandates	  entering	  it,	  at	  least	  partly	  because	  it	  looks	  canopied.	  Alternatively,	  in	  
the	  action-­‐first	  direction,	  the	  component	  perceptual	  experience	  represents	  a	  
rationalizing	  property,	  because	  you	  experience	  the	  mandate.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  forest	  
would	  look	  canopied,	  at	  least	  partly	  because	  the	  experience	  mandates	  entering	  it.	  A	  
third	  option	  is	  neither	  factor	  is	  explanatorily	  prior	  to	  the	  other	  (perhaps	  they	  are	  
connected	  by	  a	  feedback	  loop).	  
	  
	   In	  the	  content-­‐first	  and	  feedback	  loop	  options,	  the	  contents	  of	  the	  perceptual	  
experience	  could	  clearly	  help	  explain	  why	  the	  subject	  performs	  the	  mandated	  action.	  
First,	  they	  contribute	  to	  making	  the	  affordance	  salient,	  and	  this	  helps	  explain	  why	  it	  is	  
experienced	  as	  a	  mandate.	  Second,	  since	  on	  these	  options	  the	  component	  perceptual	  
experience	  is	  explanatorily	  upstream	  of	  the	  experienced	  mandate,	  they	  help	  explain	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  On	  attentional	  suppression	  see	  van	  Rullen	  and	  Koch	  (2003).	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role	  of	  the	  experienced	  mandate	  in	  guiding	  action.	  	  
	  
	   What	  if	  the	  rationalizing	  contents	  are	  related	  to	  the	  mandate	  in	  the	  action-­‐first	  
direction	  (e.g.,	  the	  bed	  looks	  fluffy,	  because	  the	  subject	  experiences	  plopping	  down	  on	  it	  
as	  mandated)?	  The	  perceiver	  collapses	  onto	  the	  bed	  because	  she	  is	  exhausted,	  not	  
because	  of	  the	  way	  the	  bed	  looks	  to	  her.	  Here	  the	  contentful	  sub-­‐experience	  
contributes	  to	  the	  perceiver’s	  intellectual	  coherence	  and	  integrity.	  Compare	  a	  case	  of	  
psychological	  (as	  opposed	  to	  normative)	  rationalization.	  When	  people	  with	  excessive	  
fear	  of	  heights	  stand	  on	  high	  balconies,	  their	  acrophobia	  ends	  up	  exaggerating	  how	  high	  
they	  believe	  the	  balcony	  to	  be,	  compared	  to	  height	  estimates	  by	  non-­‐acrophobes.20	  Let	  
us	  suppose	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  argument	  that	  they	  don’t	  fear	  the	  height	  because	  the	  balcony	  
seems	  so	  high	  off	  the	  ground,	  but	  rather	  that	  the	  balcony	  seems	  so	  high	  off	  the	  ground	  
in	  part	  because	  they	  are	  afraid	  of	  heights.	  On	  the	  assumption	  that	  with	  all	  else	  equal,	  it	  
is	  more	  reasonable	  to	  be	  nervous	  about	  standing	  on	  a	  higher	  balcony	  than	  a	  lower	  one,	  
the	  acrophobes’	  mistaken	  belief	  about	  how	  high	  the	  balcony	  is	  brings	  their	  fear	  into	  
harmony	  with	  beliefs	  –	  even	  if	  the	  beliefs	  themselves	  are	  unreasonable,	  caused	  as	  they	  
are	  by	  an	  excessive	  fear,	  rather	  than	  by	  an	  accurate	  assessment	  of	  the	  situation.	  Even	  
the	  craziest,	  most	  irrational	  subjects	  sometimes	  display	  this	  type	  of	  internal	  cognitive	  
harmony,	  such	  as	  the	  schizophrenic	  patient	  who	  is	  highly	  anxious	  because	  he	  thinks	  that	  
the	  world	  is	  about	  to	  end	  and	  finds	  the	  arrangement	  of	  chess	  pieces	  on	  the	  chessboard	  
to	  be	  ominous.	  	  
	  
In	  these	  cases,	  the	  beliefs	  that	  the	  chess	  pieces	  are	  ominous	  and	  that	  the	  
balcony	  is	  very	  high	  rationalize	  the	  background	  anxiety	  or	  fear	  in	  something	  like	  the	  way	  
that	  the	  fluffy-­‐bed	  experience	  and	  the	  contentful	  sub-­‐experiences	  in	  our	  other	  examples	  
rationalize	  experienced	  mandates.	  The	  contentful	  states	  in	  all	  of	  these	  cases,	  whether	  
they	  are	  beliefs	  or	  experiences,	  give	  us	  a	  way	  to	  describe	  this	  phenomenon	  in	  which	  
subjects	  (or	  their	  subpersonal	  processes)	  bring	  their	  psychological	  states	  into	  a	  type	  of	  
cognitive	  harmony.21	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  contentful	  states	  figure	  in	  these	  processes,	  they	  
are	  not	  explanatorily	  idle.	  
	  
	   Let	  us	  turn	  to	  the	  third	  question	  about	  the	  role	  of	  representation	  in	  experienced	  
mandates.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Stefanucci	  and	  Proffitt	  (2009)	  provide	  some	  evidence	  that	  something	  like	  this	  
phenomenon	  actually	  occurs.	  Using	  a	  variety	  of	  measures,	  both	  acrophobes	  and	  non-­‐	  
acrophobes	  tend	  to	  overestimate	  the	  height	  of	  balconies	  they	  are	  standing	  on,	  but	  
acrophobes	  exaggerate	  the	  height	  substantially	  more	  than	  non-­‐acrophobes.	  	  
21	  If	  perceptual	  experiences	  stand	  in	  rational	  relations	  to	  one	  another,	  then	  they	  belong	  
to	  a	  domain	  in	  which	  rational	  assessment	  apply.	  For	  discussion	  of	  larger	  implications	  for	  
this	  idea	  for	  epistemology,	  see	  Siegel	  2013	  and	  Siegel	  (forthcoming).	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Q3.	  Is	  there	  any	  proposition	  that	  could	  reflect	  the	  mandate	  that	  the	  subject	  experiences,	  
if	  that	  proposition	  were	  the	  content	  of	  the	  experience?	  
	  
If	  all	  we	  knew	  about	  a	  subject’s	  perceptual	  experience	  is	  that	  it	  had	  non-­‐
rationalizing	  properties,	  then	  we	  could	  not	  read	  off	  from	  her	  perceptual	  experience	  the	  
fact	  that	  a	  subject	  feels	  solicited	  to	  do	  something	  by	  her	  environment,	  let	  alone	  that	  she	  
is	  motivated	  to	  meet	  the	  situation	  with	  the	  solicited	  action.	  Neither	  could	  we	  read	  this	  
off	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  experience	  represents	  properties	  that	  would	  rationalize	  
plopping	  down	  on	  a	  bed	  or	  moving	  a	  tuft	  of	  hair	  out	  of	  the	  way.	  Some	  other	  aspect	  of	  
the	  experience	  would	  have	  to	  account	  for	  the	  soliciting	  and	  the	  motivating	  aspects	  of	  
experienced	  mandates.	  	  
	  
	   Can	  we	  identify	  a	  proposition	  that	  could	  reflect	  both	  the	  soliciting	  and	  
motivating	  aspects	  of	  experienced	  mandates?	  Let	  us	  start	  with	  the	  soliciting	  aspect	  of	  
experienced	  mandates.	  How	  could	  contents	  locate	  the	  solicitation	  in	  something	  
perceptually	  experienced?	  Contents	  of	  the	  form	  “X	  is	  to-­‐be-­‐phi’d”,	  such	  as	  ‘the	  hair	  is	  
to-­‐be-­‐moved’,	  ‘the	  passerby	  is	  to-­‐be-­‐made-­‐way-­‐for’	  are	  a	  straightforward	  way	  to	  
characterize	  the	  mandated	  action,	  while	  preserving	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  mandate	  is	  
experienced	  as	  issued	  by	  something	  external	  that	  we	  perceive.	  Consider	  the	  difference	  
between	  the	  predicates	  “to-­‐be-­‐phi’d”	  and	  “to-­‐be-­‐done”.	  Whereas	  “to-­‐be-­‐moved-­‐out-­‐of-­‐
the-­‐way”	  is	  applied	  to	  the	  interlocutor’s	  tuft	  of	  hair	  or	  to	  some	  other	  obstacle,	  “to-­‐be-­‐
done”	  is	  applied	  to	  actions,	  such	  as	  moving	  hair	  out	  of	  the	  way,	  or	  making	  room	  on	  the	  
sidewalk.	  Given	  the	  assumption	  that	  solicitations	  are	  experienced	  as	  being	  issued	  by	  
things	  like	  cake	  and	  forests,	  a	  natural	  hypothesis	  is	  that	  experienced	  mandates	  
represent	  specific	  to-­‐be-­‐phi’d	  properties,	  attributing	  them	  to	  things	  perceptually	  
experienced.	  
	  
	   What	  about	  the	  motivating	  aspect	  of	  experienced	  mandates?	  To	  bring	  this	  
aspect	  of	  experienced	  mandates	  back	  into	  focus,	  recall	  the	  two	  music	  cases.	  The	  two	  
experiences	  of	  music	  both	  solicit	  dancing,	  but	  they	  differ	  in	  whether	  they	  motivate	  the	  
perceiver	  to	  dance.	  What,	  if	  anything,	  can	  differentiate	  between	  pairs	  of	  cases	  that	  
differ	  only	  in	  this	  way,	  consistently	  with	  experiencing	  the	  mandate	  as	  issuing	  from	  the	  
thing	  perceived?	  Could	  the	  motivational	  part	  of	  the	  mandate	  be	  reflected	  in	  contents	  
that	  characterize	  how	  the	  music	  sounds,	  or	  how	  the	  forest,	  hair,	  sidewalk,	  tennis	  ball	  etc	  
look?	  	  	  
	   One	  might	  think	  this	  aspect	  of	  experienced	  mandates	  is	  not	  representable	  in	  
experience,	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  is	  a	  conative	  state,	  and	  experiences	  only	  take	  a	  stand	  
on	  how	  the	  world	  actually	  is,	  not	  on	  how	  one	  wants	  it	  to	  be	  or	  is	  motivated	  to	  shape	  it.	  
If	  Hume,	  Searle,	  and	  others	  who	  endorse	  this	  sharp	  division	  are	  right,	  then	  at	  most,	  the	  
soliciting	  aspect	  of	  experienced	  mandates	  could	  be	  represented	  in	  experience.	  
	   A	  first	  attempt	  to	  find	  a	  place	  for	  the	  motivating	  aspect	  of	  experienced	  mandates	  
in	  accuracy	  conditions	  adds	  the	  issuing	  of	  a	  mandate	  by	  X	  (cake,	  forest,	  hair,	  etc)	  to	  the	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‘to-­‐be-­‐phi’d	  property.	  The	  result	  would	  be	  that	  experience	  has	  conjunction	  of	  contents.	  
Here	  are	  some	  candidates	  for	  the	  conjunction:	  	  
	   Exp:	  X	  is	  to-­‐be-­‐phi’d	  and	  X...	  
	   	   …wants	  me	  to	  phi	  
	   	   …is	  telling	  me	  to	  phi	  
	   	   …commands	  me	  to	  phi	  
	   	   …intends	  for	  me	  to	  phi.	  
	  
But	  this	  option	  does	  not	  identify	  any	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  music	  cases,	  for	  the	  
same	  reason	  that	  ‘X	  is	  to-­‐be-­‐phi’d’	  does	  not	  identify	  any	  such	  difference.	  One	  need	  not	  
feel	  moved	  by	  what	  X	  wants,	  tells	  you,	  or	  intends.	  As	  evidenced	  by	  long-­‐standing,	  
unfulfilled	  to-­‐do	  lists,	  representing	  that	  something	  is	  to	  be	  done,	  for	  instance	  by	  writing	  
it	  down	  on	  a	  list	  of	  things	  to	  do,	  does	  not	  suffice	  to	  motivate	  you	  to	  do	  it.	  
	  
	   A	  different	  strategy	  is	  to	  complicate	  the	  second	  component	  of	  content	  further,	  
by	  adding	  a	  causal	  relation	  that	  links	  the	  soliciting	  aspects	  to	  a	  desire	  or	  an	  action:	  
	  
• Exp:	  X	  is	  to-­‐be-­‐phi’d,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  X	  is	  to-­‐be-­‐phi’d	  	  
…makes	  me	  want	  to	  phi.	  
	   	   …is	  making	  me	  phi.	  
• Exp:	  X	  is	  to-­‐be-­‐phi’d,	  and	  because	  X	  is	  to-­‐be-­‐phi’d,	  I	  am	  going	  to	  phi.	  
	  
These	  proposals	  posit	  ascriptions	  of	  one’s	  own	  desires	  or	  intensions	  as	  part	  of	  the	  
content	  of	  experience,	  and	  one	  might	  worry	  that	  this	  fails	  to	  respect	  the	  way	  in	  which	  
perceptual	  experience	  is	  directed	  outward,	  characterizing	  things	  external	  to	  the	  
subejct’s	  mind.	  The	  phenomenal	  integration	  of	  solicitation	  and	  motivation	  is	  reflected	  in	  
the	  unreflective	  nature	  of	  habitual	  and	  specialized	  skilled	  action.	  Sartre	  describes	  the	  
integration	  when	  he	  uses	  a	  locution	  of	  the	  form	  “to-­‐be-­‐phi’d”	  to	  describe	  being	  
“plunged	  into	  the	  world	  of	  objects”:	  
	  
When	  I	  run	  after	  a	  streetcar,	  when	  I	  look	  at	  the	  time,	  when	  I	  am	  absorbed	  in	  
contemplating	  a	  portrait,	  there	  is	  no	  I.	  There	  is	  consciousness	  of	  the	  streetcar-­‐having-­‐
to-­‐be-­‐overtaken...	  I	  am	  then	  plunged	  into	  the	  world	  of	  objects;	  it	  is	  they	  which	  
constitute	  the	  unity	  of	  my	  consciousness;	  it	  is	  they	  which	  present	  themselves	  with	  
values,	  with	  attractive	  and	  repellant	  qualities	  –	  but	  I	  have	  disappeared;	  I	  have	  
annihilated	  myself.	  There	  is	  no	  place	  for	  me	  on	  this	  level.	  And	  this	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	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chance,	  due	  to	  a	  momentary	  lapse	  of	  attention,	  but	  happens	  because	  of	  the	  very	  
structure	  of	  consciousness.22	  
	  
Sartre	  may	  overstate	  the	  ‘disappearance	  of	  the	  subject’.	  Representations	  of	  
directionality	  and	  distance	  have	  an	  implicit	  first-­‐person	  component,	  so	  contents	  
involving	  the	  subject	  seem	  indispensable.	  But	  he	  seems	  right	  that	  the	  subject	  disappears	  
as	  a	  subject	  of	  desire.	  We	  need	  not	  be	  aware	  of	  our	  motivation	  to	  hit	  the	  tennis	  ball,	  or	  
flick	  the	  light	  switch,	  or	  move	  aside	  to	  let	  the	  oncoming	  pedestrian	  pass.	  We’re	  just	  
aware	  of	  the	  ball,	  the	  switch,	  the	  sidewalk,	  etc.	  	  
	   A	  more	  promising	  proposal	  is	  that	  the	  motivating	  aspect	  of	  experienced	  mandate	  
casts	  its	  shadow	  on	  the	  contents	  of	  experience,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  contents	  that	  include	  a	  
property	  related	  to	  answerability.	  	  What’s	  needed	  is	  a	  hypothesis	  that	  identifies	  
contents	  that	  are	  correlated	  with	  the	  feeling	  of	  answerability	  to	  a	  soliciting	  affordance.23	  
The	  effort	  to	  find	  such	  contents	  may	  seem	  futile,	  for	  any	  of	  three	  reasons:	  
• Challenge	  1:	  The	  feeling	  of	  answerability	  has	  no	  internal	  structure	  to	  it,	  because	  
it	  is	  a	  simple	  ‘buzz’	  akin	  to	  a	  valence	  that	  attaches	  to	  thing	  you	  feel	  answerable	  to.	  
• Challenge	  2:	  The	  feeling	  of	  answerability	  belongs	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  force-­‐content	  
distinction	  belonging	  to	  force.	  
• Challenge	  3:	  The	  only	  contents	  that	  are	  correlated	  with	  the	  feeling	  of	  
answerability	  in	  experienced	  mandates	  are	  a	  version	  of	  “A	  is	  to-­‐be-­‐done”,	  and	  
these	  have	  the	  same	  problem	  considered	  earlier.	  From	  the	  fact	  that	  you	  represent	  
something	  as	  to-­‐be-­‐done,	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  that	  you	  are	  motivated	  to	  do	  A.	  
Regarding	  the	  first	  challenge,	  assuming	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  felt	  valence	  has	  psychological	  
validity,	  it	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  suppose	  that	  it	  figures	  in	  feelings	  of	  answerability	  in	  
experienced	  mandates.24	  But	  it	  is	  doubtful	  that	  the	  felt	  valences	  exhaust	  those	  feelings	  
of	  answerability.	  If	  a	  pack	  of	  chewing	  gum	  looks	  appealing,	  it	  need	  not	  cost	  you	  any	  
dissonance	  to	  ignore	  it.	  Here	  the	  perception	  of	  the	  gum	  does	  not	  involve	  any	  persisting	  
inner	  mobilization	  of	  the	  sort	  that	  characterizes	  the	  feeling	  of	  answerability.	  
	   The	  other	  two	  challenges	  are	  not	  easily	  rejected.	  On	  the	  face	  of	  it,	  feeling	  
answerable	  to	  a	  solicitation	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  mode	  of	  experiencing	  the	  solicitation.	  One	  
experiences	  it	  in	  a	  mobilizing	  way,	  as	  opposed	  to	  experiencing	  it	  indifferently.	  This	  
observation	  suggests	  that	  it	  must	  belong	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  force/content	  distinction	  
belonging	  to	  force.	  And	  while	  a	  natural	  candidate	  for	  an	  accuracy	  condition	  associated	  
with	  the	  feeling	  of	  answerability	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  “A	  is	  to-­‐be-­‐answered”,	  this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Jean-­‐Paul	  Sartre,	  The	  Transcendence	  of	  the	  Ego	  1957,	  pp.48-­‐49.	  I	  put	  in	  bold	  the	  
locution	  of	  interest.	  
23	  I	  leave	  open	  whether	  the	  contents	  are	  constitutively	  linked	  to	  the	  phenomenal	  
character,	  rather	  than	  being	  merely	  correlated	  with	  them.	  
24	  For	  discussion	  of	  microvalences,	  see	  Lebrecht	  et	  al	  (2012).	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suggestion	  invites	  the	  charge	  that	  like	  other	  ‘to-­‐be-­‐phi’d’	  contents,	  it	  too	  can	  be	  
entertained	  indifferently.	  	  
	   The	  strongest	  answer	  to	  these	  substantial	  challenges	  combines	  structural	  
considerations	  with	  closer	  attention	  to	  what	  is	  experienced	  in	  the	  feelings	  of	  
answerability	  that	  are	  at	  issue.	  The	  structural	  consideration	  is	  that	  contents	  could	  have	  
a	  nested	  structure	  that	  reflects	  the	  main	  idea	  driving	  Challenge	  2.	  The	  nested	  structure	  
seems	  to	  respect	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  are	  both	  motivated	  and	  indifferent	  ways	  to	  
experience	  soliciting	  affordances.	  Leaving	  a	  crucial	  element	  partly	  blank	  for	  now,	  the	  
structure	  could	  be	  this:	  
	   Experience:	  [It	  is	  <…..answerability…>	  that:	  X	  is	  to-­‐be-­‐phi’d].	  
What	  fills	  in	  the	  ellipsis	  to	  create	  an	  accuracy	  condition?	  “…to-­‐be-­‐answered…”	  sounds	  
prospective,	  and	  suggests	  that	  answering	  to	  the	  soliciting	  affordance	  	  is	  something	  the	  
subject	  may	  or	  may	  not	  go	  on	  to	  do,	  whereas	  what	  we’re	  looking	  for	  is	  a	  way	  to	  reflect	  
the	  fact	  that	  the	  subject	  is	  already	  answering	  to	  the	  soliciting	  affordance.	  A	  better	  
proposal	  is	  thus:	  
	   Experience:	  [It	  is	  answered	  that:	  X	  is	  to-­‐be-­‐phi’d.]	  
I’ll	  call	  the	  contents	  on	  the	  right	  side	  of	  the	  word	  “Experience”	  answerability	  contents.	  
	   Of	  course	  these	  contents	  are	  not	  anything	  one	  would	  find	  natural	  to	  say	  in	  
describing	  the	  experience.	  But	  the	  same	  is	  true	  of	  many	  other	  accuracy	  conditions	  such	  
as	  special	  contents.	  The	  proposal	  here	  respects	  the	  integration	  of	  soliciting	  and	  
motivating	  aspects	  of	  experienced	  mandates,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  soliciting	  affordance	  
generates	  a	  feeling	  of	  answerability.	  	  
	   In	  cases	  where	  an	  experience	  also	  represents	  rationalizing	  properties,	  the	  
contents	  embedded	  in	  “it	  is	  answered	  that”	  may	  be	  more	  complex,	  integrating	  the	  
rationalizing	  properties	  with	  the	  to-­‐be-­‐phi’d	  property.	  For	  instance,	  “It	  is	  to	  be	  answered	  
that:	  the	  bed	  is	  to-­‐be-­‐plopped	  down	  upon	  and	  is	  fluffy”.	  I	  leave	  it	  open	  whether	  the	  
rationalizing	  relation	  itself	  might	  be	  represented	  in	  experience,	  as	  would	  be	  reflected	  in	  
contents	  such	  as	  “…to	  bed	  is	  to-­‐be-­‐plopped	  down	  upon	  because	  it	  is	  fluffy”.25	  	  
	   What	  are	  some	  cases	  in	  which	  these	  accuracy	  conditions	  are	  met,	  and	  what	  are	  
some	  cases	  in	  which	  they	  are	  not	  met?	  It	  seems	  plausible	  that	  the	  feeling	  of	  
answerability	  suffices	  for	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  feeling	  to	  be	  answering	  to	  something	  in	  a	  
minimal	  way	  –	  a	  way	  that	  does	  not	  consist	  in	  taking	  the	  thing	  that	  they	  are	  answering	  to	  
(such	  as	  a	  piece	  of	  cake)	  to	  be	  a	  source	  of	  normative	  constraint.	  If	  so,	  then	  answerability	  
contents	  are	  always	  correct.	  Compatibly	  with	  this	  result,	  a	  subject	  could	  in	  principle	  
make	  an	  introspective	  error	  about	  whether	  she	  is	  or	  isn’t	  feeling	  answerable	  to	  
something.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  For	  discussion	  of	  seeing	  reasons,	  see	  Church	  2010.	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   In	  addition	  to	  probing	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  answerability	  contents	  are	  
true,	  we	  can	  also	  ask	  about	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  the	  ‘X	  is	  to-­‐be-­‐phi’d’	  contents	  
they	  embed	  are	  accurate.	  What	  would	  it	  take	  for	  it	  to	  be	  the	  case	  that	  the	  hair	  really	  is	  
to-­‐be-­‐moved,	  or	  that	  the	  forest	  really	  is	  to-­‐be-­‐entered,	  the	  oncoming	  pedestrian	  is	  to-­‐
be-­‐made-­‐way-­‐for,	  or	  that	  the	  cake	  really	  is	  to-­‐be-­‐eaten?	  These	  questions	  have	  no	  
general	  answer,	  because	  the	  contents	  do	  not	  specify	  what	  kind	  of	  ‘ought’	  underlies	  the	  
mandate.	  For	  instance,	  if	  the	  morally	  correct	  thing	  to	  do	  on	  the	  path	  is	  move	  aside	  by	  
giving	  the	  passerby	  lots	  of	  room	  to	  pass,	  then	  relative	  to	  moral	  ‘ought’,	  the	  pedestrian	  is	  
to-­‐be-­‐made-­‐way-­‐for.	  In	  the	  hair	  case,	  relative	  to	  the	  ‘ought’	  of	  social	  mores,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  
case	  that	  the	  hair	  is	  to-­‐be-­‐moved,	  but	  perhaps	  relative	  to	  the	  ‘ought’	  of	  communicative	  
efficacy	  or	  aesthetic	  rightness,	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  the	  hair	  is	  to-­‐be-­‐moved	  (assuming	  that	  
the	  interlocutor	  really	  does	  have	  an	  eye	  underneath	  the	  hair).	  	  
	  	  Even	  though	  answerability	  contents	  do	  not	  specify	  a	  norm	  relative	  to	  which	  
they	  are	  accurate,	  which	  mandates	  a	  person	  experiences	  can	  indicate	  which	  norms	  she	  
is	  sensitive	  to.	  In	  talking	  to	  a	  person	  you	  might	  feel	  a	  mandate	  to	  stop	  listening,	  or	  
deeply	  discount	  what	  they	  say,	  or	  (on	  the	  other	  side)	  to	  put	  a	  lot	  of	  stock	  in	  what	  they	  
say.	  Such	  experiences	  might	  manifest	  and	  perpetuate	  background	  attitudes	  of	  
deference	  or	  disrespect.	  They	  illustrate	  the	  potential	  use	  of	  the	  framework	  of	  
answerability	  contents	  in	  analyzing	  the	  interpersonal	  interactions.	  Such	  modes	  of	  
aversion	  and	  approach	  can	  be	  the	  social	  instrument	  by	  which	  social	  patterns	  are	  
maintained,	  such	  as	  patterns	  of	  exclusion	  and	  inclusion,	  or	  trust	  and	  dismissiveness.	  	  
These	  considerations	  can	  illuminate	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  to-­‐be-­‐phi’d	  
contents	  would	  be	  accurate.	  Relative	  to	  the	  social	  norms	  that	  such	  experienced	  
mandates	  manifest,	  the	  answerability	  contents	  would	  be	  accurate,	  where	  relative	  to	  
epistemic	  or	  moral	  norms,	  they	  might	  be	  inaccurate.	  For	  instance,	  if	  one	  experiences	  
one’s	  interlocutors	  comments	  as	  to-­‐be-­‐discounted	  when	  such	  discounting	  would	  be	  
epistemically	  inappropriate,	  then	  the	  ‘to-­‐be-­‐discounted’	  contents	  could	  be	  accurate	  
relative	  to	  a	  social	  norm	  that	  mandates	  discounting,	  but	  inaccurate	  relative	  to	  epistemic	  
norms.	  
The	  ‘to-­‐be-­‐phi’d’	  contents	  that	  answerability	  contents	  embed	  are	  thus	  not	  
complete	  accuracy	  conditions,	  because	  they	  leave	  unspecified	  a	  parameter	  that	  needs	  
to	  be	  fixed	  in	  order	  to	  generate	  an	  accuracy	  condition.	  The	  reason	  to	  think	  this	  
parameter	  is	  left	  unspecified	  is	  that	  there	  don’t	  seem	  to	  be	  phenomenal	  differences	  that	  
track	  different	  norms	  relative	  to	  which	  to-­‐be-­‐phi’d	  contents	  could	  be	  assessed	  for	  
accuracy.	  	  
	   I’ve	  replied	  positively	  to	  question	  Q3	  by	  arguing	  that	  answerability	  contents	  
could	  identify	  a	  proposition	  that	  reflects	  that	  mandate	  that	  the	  subject	  experiences.	  
Answerability	  contents	  are	  always	  true,	  and	  that	  embedded	  contents	  can	  be	  accurate	  or	  
inaccurate	  only	  once	  an	  additional	  parameter	  is	  fixed.	  In	  light	  of	  these	  facts,	  does	  this	  
response	  to	  Q3	  concede	  anything	  to	  overall	  challenge	  to	  the	  primacy	  of	  representation	  
from	  experienced	  mandates?	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  embedded	  contents	  are	  accurate	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only	  relative	  to	  a	  type	  of	  norm	  that	  the	  experiences	  do	  not	  themselves	  specify,	  
experienced	  mandates	  fail	  to	  provide	  full	  accuracy	  conditions	  by	  themselves.26	  But	  
rather	  than	  being	  irrelevant	  to	  experienced	  mandates,	  the	  proposal	  that	  experiences	  
have	  answerability	  contents	  would	  let	  us	  express	  important	  features	  of	  this	  
phenomenon.	  It	  would	  let	  us	  see	  rational	  relationships	  between	  subexperiences,	  it	  
provides	  a	  framework	  for	  understanding	  mechanisms	  of	  social	  interactions	  including	  
power	  relationships	  exerted	  through	  discourse,	  and	  it	  gives	  us	  a	  way	  to	  analyze	  common	  
phenomenal	  strand	  throughout	  different	  forms	  of	  normativity.	  The	  remaining	  question	  
is	  then	  whether	  experienced	  mandates	  have	  answerability	  contents.	  
	  
Do	  experienced	  mandates	  have	  answerability	  contents?	  
	   With	  answerability	  contents	  on	  the	  table,	  we	  can	  return	  to	  the	  stronger	  thesis	  
that	  experienced	  mandates	  have	  contents	  like	  these.	  This	  thesis	  goes	  beyond	  answering	  
our	  initial	  three	  questions	  Q1-­‐Q3.	  Can	  we	  discover	  whether	  experienced	  mandates	  have	  
such	  contents?	  
	   A	  possible	  strategy	  starts	  from	  the	  substantial	  assumption	  that	  affordances	  can	  
be	  represented	  in	  experience	  (and	  therefore	  experiences	  have	  accuracy	  conditions),	  
rather	  than	  trying	  to	  defend	  the	  stronger	  thesis	  from	  the	  ground	  up.	  Given	  this	  
assumption,	  one	  might	  try	  to	  argue	  for	  two	  conditionals:	  
Affordances	  	  Solicitations:	  If	  affordances	  are	  represented	  in	  experience,	  then	  
solicitations	  are	  too.	  	  
Solicitations	  	  Mandates:	  If	  solicitations	  are	  represented	  in	  experience,	  then	  
mandates	  are	  too.	  
Favoring	  the	  Affordance	  	  Solicitation	  conditional,	  one	  might	  reason	  roughly	  as	  follows.	  
From	  the	  cases	  of	  advertising	  and	  dance	  music,	  the	  feeling	  of	  being	  solicited	  by	  the	  
environment	  to	  do	  something	  is	  familiar.	  If	  we	  are	  entitled	  (by	  our	  starting	  assumption)	  
to	  use	  the	  idea	  that	  affordances	  are	  represented	  in	  experience	  to	  analyze	  perceptual	  
experience,	  it	  is	  natural	  to	  use	  it	  for	  the	  special	  class	  of	  salient	  affordances	  that	  we	  
experience	  as	  soliciting.	  There	  seems	  to	  be	  no	  principled	  bar	  to	  extending	  the	  analysis	  of	  
perceptual	  experience	  from	  representing	  of	  affordances	  to	  representing	  the	  special	  case	  
of	  soliciting	  affordances.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Klein	  (2007)	  observes	  that	  experiences	  with	  imperatival	  contents	  (such	  as	  “step	  
gingerly	  on	  your	  left	  foot”)	  would	  not	  threaten	  representationalism	  about	  experience.	  
This	  observation	  is	  true	  but	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  discussion	  of	  experienced	  mandates,	  since	  
replacing	  the	  declarative	  content	  “the	  hair	  is	  to-­‐be-­‐moved”	  with	  the	  imperatival	  content	  
“move	  the	  hair”	  would	  not	  suffice	  to	  reflect	  the	  motivated	  aspect	  of	  experienced	  
mandates.	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Favoring	  the	  Solicitation	  	  Mandate	  conditional,	  one	  could	  try	  to	  use	  the	  method	  of	  
phenomenal	  contrast	  to	  evaluate	  hypotheses	  about	  what	  best	  explains	  of	  the	  
phenomenal	  contrast	  between	  the	  two	  music	  cases,	  or	  another	  pair	  of	  cases	  in	  which	  
two	  subjects	  seem	  to	  have	  experiences	  with	  the	  same	  solicitation	  content,	  but	  differ	  in	  
whether	  they	  feel	  motivated	  to	  fulfill	  the	  solicitation	  they	  experience.	  The	  method	  could	  
either	  be	  used	  to	  evaluate	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  motivational	  aspect	  is	  best	  analyzed	  
in	  terms	  of	  accuracy	  conditions	  of	  the	  form:	  
It	  is	  answered	  that:	  X	  is	  to-­‐be-­‐phi’d.	  
(The	  same	  cases	  and	  method	  could	  also	  be	  used	  to	  evaluate	  other	  hypothesis	  that	  posit	  
different	  accuracy	  conditions,	  or	  something	  other	  than	  accuracy	  conditions).	  Since	  the	  
burden	  of	  the	  strategy	  is	  to	  show	  that	  this	  is	  the	  best	  explanation	  of	  the	  phenomenal	  
contrast,	  alternative	  hypotheses	  need	  to	  be	  considered.	  We	  considered	  some	  
alternatives	  earlier	  in	  the	  conjunctive	  proposals,	  and	  the	  proposals	  that	  mirror	  Searle’s	  
hypothesis	  about	  the	  satisfaction	  conditions	  of	  perceptual	  experience.	  The	  alternatives	  
also	  include	  one	  suggested	  by	  Dreyfus’s	  remarks	  about	  the	  dynamic	  of	  tension	  and	  relief	  
that	  fuel	  the	  intentional	  arc.	  This	  dynamic	  might	  be	  invoked	  to	  analyze	  both	  the	  
soliciting	  and	  the	  motivating	  aspects	  of	  experienced	  mandates.	  Relief	  arises	  from	  
meeting	  the	  situation	  with	  the	  mandated	  action,	  and	  tension	  from	  not	  meeting	  it	  that	  
way,	  or	  from	  not	  yet	  having	  done	  so.	  Given	  these	  correlations,	  the	  dynamic	  of	  tension	  
and	  relief	  is	  well-­‐suited	  to	  guide	  the	  action,	  which	  is	  part	  of	  threatens	  to	  make	  the	  
contents	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  explanatorily	  irrelevant.	  	  
	   But	  by	  itself,	  the	  dynamic	  of	  tension	  and	  relief	  does	  not	  account	  for	  the	  
experience	  of	  solicitation	  per	  se.	  Nothing	  in	  the	  ebb	  and	  flow	  of	  tension	  and	  relief	  
reflects	  the	  experience	  of	  hair,	  passerby,	  or	  forest	  soliciting	  one	  to	  perfection	  an	  action	  
that	  will	  relieve	  the	  tension	  one	  feels	  in	  that	  situation.	  You	  might	  feel	  worse	  if	  you	  don’t	  
move	  the	  hair,	  and	  better	  if	  you	  do,	  but	  those	  facts	  could	  obtain	  even	  if	  you	  don’t	  feel	  
pulled	  by	  the	  hair	  to	  move	  it	  aside.	  One	  need	  not	  be	  “plunged	  into	  the	  world	  of	  objects”	  
for	  the	  facts	  about	  tension	  and	  relief	  to	  hold.	  	  
	  
	   This	  observation	  forms	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  dilemma	  concerning	  the	  relationship	  
between	  the	  situation	  and	  the	  feelings	  of	  tensions	  and	  relief	  that	  it	  gives	  rise	  to.	  Either	  
the	  course	  of	  tension	  and	  relief	  is	  merely	  caused	  by	  the	  situation	  in	  one’s	  immediate	  
environment,	  or	  else	  those	  feelings	  are	  psychologically	  more	  complex	  responses	  to	  the	  
situation	  that	  involves	  some	  type	  of	  understanding	  what	  the	  situation	  demands.	  If	  the	  
relationship	  is	  merely	  causal,	  then	  that	  relationship	  by	  itself	  does	  not	  illuminate	  how	  the	  
situation	  is	  experienced	  as	  soliciting	  the	  action	  to	  which	  tension	  and	  relief	  are	  sensitive.	  
If	  instead	  the	  tension	  and	  relief	  are	  byproduct	  of	  understanding	  of	  what	  the	  situation	  
calls	  for,	  then	  that	  understanding,	  whatever	  form	  it	  takes,	  has	  just	  as	  much	  claim	  to	  
guiding	  the	  action	  as	  the	  dynamic	  of	  tension	  and	  relief	  has.	  Either	  way,	  the	  dynamic	  of	  
tension	  and	  relief	  by	  itself	  is	  inadequate	  to	  account	  for	  experiences	  of	  being	  solicited	  by	  
things	  in	  the	  environment.	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   I	  have	  outlined	  an	  argumentative	  strategy	  for	  the	  thesis	  that	  mandates	  are	  
reflected	  in	  the	  contents	  of	  experienced	  mandates,	  and	  criticized	  one	  alternative	  
explanation.	  To	  follow	  the	  strategy	  through,	  much	  more	  would	  need	  to	  be	  said	  about	  
which	  pairs	  of	  experiences	  contrast	  phenomenally	  in	  the	  right	  way,	  and	  the	  alternative	  
explanations	  of	  that	  contrast.	  But	  the	  discussion	  of	  questions	  Q1-­‐Q3	  suggests	  the	  
strategy	  as	  a	  starting	  point.	  
Conclusion	  
	   Dreyfus	  and	  other	  writers	  who	  have	  described	  experienced	  mandates	  call	  
attention	  to	  an	  important	  fact	  about	  perception:	  sometimes	  our	  perceptual	  experiences	  
are	  pervasively	  structured	  by	  our	  role	  as	  agents	  responding	  to	  social	  situations.	  In	  other	  
situations,	  our	  dominant	  mode	  is	  not	  that	  of	  an	  agent,	  but	  a	  spectator	  –	  for	  instance	  
when	  we	  are	  freed	  from	  immediate	  pressures	  of	  spatial	  negotiation,	  simply	  taking	  in	  our	  
surroundings.	  These	  writers	  are	  right	  to	  emphasize	  that	  phenomenologically,	  perception	  
feels	  quite	  different	  depending	  on	  whether	  it	  is	  dominantly	  structured	  by	  our	  roles	  as	  
agents	  or	  not.	  	  And	  that	  raises	  a	  question:	  to	  what	  extent	  are	  our	  experiences	  structured	  
by	  experienced	  mandates,	  to	  what	  extent	  aren’t	  they?	  An	  upshot	  of	  the	  discussion	  here	  
is	  that	  even	  if	  the	  extent	  is	  great,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  spectator	  never	  disappears	  completely,	  
even	  when	  we’re	  in	  the	  throes	  of	  action.	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